4. rujna 1941

4. rujna 1941


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4. rujna 1941

Rujna 1941

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Istočni front

Finski vojnici stigli su do granice prije Zimskog rata. Napredovanje Finske na ovom mjestu prestaje

Mediteran

Zračni napadi pogodili su Maltu



Ted Williams postaje posljednji igrač koji je pogodio .400

Dana 28. rujna 1941., Boston Red Sox's Ted Williams posljednjeg dana regularne sezone igra dvostruko glavom protiv Philadelphia Athletics-a i dobiva šest pogodaka u osam putovanja do ploče, kako bi svoj prosjek udaraca povećao na 0,406. i postao prvi igrač od Billa Terryja 1930. koji je pogodio .400. Williams, koji je cijelu svoju karijeru proveo sa Soxom, odigrao je svoju posljednju utakmicu točno 19 godina kasnije, 28. rujna 1960. u Boston's Fenway Parku i postigao domaći pogodak u posljednji put na palici, za ukupno karijeru od 521 homeruns.

Williams je rođen 30. kolovoza 1918. u San Diegu, a prvoligašku karijeru započeo je s Red Soxom 1939. 1941. označila je Williamsu##najbolju sezonu. Uz svoj prosjek u udarnim udarcima .406, bez#prvoligaškog igrača otkad je pogodio .400 –, lijevi je igrač vodio ligu s 37 homera, 135 trčanja i prosječnim padom od 0,735. Također te sezone, Williams, čiji su nadimci uključivali “ The Splendid Splinter ” i “The Thumper, ” imao je postotak na bazi od .553, rekord koji je ostao neprekinut 61 godinu, sve dok Barry Bonds nije postigao postotak od. 052 2002. godine.

Godine 1942. Williams je osvojio Trostruku krunu američke lige, za najveći prosjek udaranja, većinu IRB -ova i homerunova. Duplirao je taj podvig 1947. Godine 1946. i 1949. proglašen je najkorisnijim igračem američke lige, a u lipnju 1960. postao je četvrti igrač u povijesti velike lige koji je pogodio 500 homera. U All-Star tim izabran je 17 puta.

Williams je odigrao svoju posljednju utakmicu 28. rujna 1960. i povukao se s doživotnim prosjekom od .344, postotkom u karijeri od .483 i 2.654 pogotka. Njegova su postignuća utoliko impresivnija jer mu je karijera dva puta prekidana zbog služenja vojnog roka: Williams je bio pilot Marine Corpsa tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata i Korejskog rata te je zbog toga propustio ukupno gotovo pet sezona od baseballa.


4. rujna 1941. - Povijest

ReSignalman Joe Moll s Greer zastavnik, ca. 1942. godine.

Greer, nazvan po kontraadmiralu Jamesu A. Greeru (1833. & ndash1904), bio je jedan od 48 podnih brodova izgrađenih u William Cramp & amp Sons Ship & amp Engine Building Building Co., Philadelphia. Lansirana je 1. kolovoza 1918., puštena u rad 31. prosinca i u početku je služila s Atlantskom flotom, prelazeći na Pacifičku flotu 1919. i na Azijsku flotu u lipnju 1920. godine.

Greer ukinuta 1937. godine i stavljena je u pričuvu u Philadelphia Navy Yard, ali je ponovno puštena u rad u listopadu 1939., ubrzo nakon početka Drugoga svjetskog rata u Europi. U to je vrijeme zadržala opći izgled, ali 1941. uklonjen je jedan hrpa.

U veljači 1940 Greer dodijeljen je Sjevernoatlantskoj patroli neutralnosti. Nakon krstarenja Karipskim morem koje je počelo u listopadu, početkom 1941. vratila se u sjeverni Atlantik, djelujući općenito između Newfoundlanda i Islanda s dobrom posadom pod LCdr -om. H. L. Frost i Cmdr. G. W. Johnson, ComDesDiv 61, krenuo.

U 0750 ujutro 4. rujna 1941. kontaktirala je britanski avion pet minuta kasnije, izvijestio je o podmornici. Greer zatvoren i uspostavljen sonarski kontakt. U 09:30 bombarder je napao cilj s četiri dubinska naboja, a zatim se vratio u bazu.

Greer nastavio je pratiti njezin kontakt tijekom sljedeća dva sata dok je stigao zrakoplov za pomoć. U 1140, s podmornicom na lučkom pramcu, Greer ugledao dva torpeda i okrenuo se prema njima, uspješno izbjegavajući. Deset minuta kasnije ispustila je deset dubinskih naboja na podmornicu, ali je pritom izgubila kontakt.

U-652, njemačka podmornica tipa VII-C, položena je u Hamburg 5. veljače 1940. i puštena u rad 3. travnja 1941. U osam ratnih ophodnji na Atlantiku i Sredozemlju potopila je pet brodova, uključujući britanski razarač HMS Heythorp kod Libije 20. ožujka 1942.

U 1230, pošto nismo uspostavili kontakt, Greer nastavio tečaj za Island. Pojavio se britanski razarač koji je potom otišao. Pet minuta kasnije, Greer ponovno uspostavio kontakt s podmornicom i odbacio još devet dubinskih naboja. Podmornica, U-652, je neoštećen.

Tjedan dana kasnije, predsjednik Roosevelt je to opisao & ldquoGreer incident & rdquo u radijskom obraćanju, u kojem je iznio doktrinu & ldquoshoot na vidiku. & rdquo

Greer ostala je u ophodnji na Atlantiku i Karibima do 1944. godine, kada je raspoređena na obalne dužnosti. Bila je izvan pogona u Philadelphiji u srpnju 1945., a tog studenog prodana je na otpad.

Izvori: Greer dnevnik palube za 4. rujna 1941., razgovori s Greer kolega s broda Joe Moll Morison, DANFS.


Na današnji dan: 4. rujna

Dana 4. rujna 1957., guverner Arkansasa Orval Faubus pozvao je Nacionalnu gardu da spriječi devet učenika crnaca da uđu u Srednju srednju školu u Little Rocku.

4. rujna 1908. rođen je Richard Wright, čije su knjige "Rodni sin" i "Crni dječak" razotkrili oštre učinke američkog rasizma. Nakon njegove smrti 28. studenog 1960., njegova osmrtnica se pojavila u The Timesu.

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Staljin se kreće protiv Nijemaca ‘Volge ’

Iz Militant, Vol. V br. 38, 20. rujna 1941., str ن.
Prepisao & amp označio Einde O ’Callaghan za Internetska enciklopedija trockizma (ETOL).

Dana 8. rujna, Kremlj je konačno obznanio tekst ukase koja protjeruje sovjetske građane masovno u Sibir zbog njihovog rasnog podrijetla! Ovaj monstruozni ukase glasi:

“PREZIDIUM VRHOVNOG VIJEĆA SSSR -a UTVRDIO JE DA JE POTREBNO PONOVNO PRESELITI CIJELO NJEMAČKO STANOVNIŠTVO VOLGSKIH REGIJA U DRUGE OKRUGE. ” (N.Y. Times, 8. rujna)

Tijekom prvog svjetskog rata, krvavi car Nicholas pribjegao je represivnim mjerama protiv svojih podanika njemačkog porijekla. Krajem 1916. godine carski režim, raspirujući rasnu mržnju, započeo je pripreme za progon svih Nijemaca iz Povolge u Sibir. Datum za masovno protjerivanje bio je travanj 1917. Evo kako je Staljin službeno rekao Sovjetska enciklopedija, sažeo je sudbinu carske ukase:

“Srušenje autokracije spriječilo je izvršenje ove barbarske mjere. Kad su kolonisti apelirali na Privremenu vladu da ukine ovaj zakon, Kerensky se složio samo s obustavom izvršenja ove ukase. ’ Tu ukazu je ukinula tek Velika listopadska socijalistička revolucija koja je stala na kraj nacionalnom ugnjetavanju i koja je otvorila uz široku magistralu za razvoj nacionalne kulture, socijalističku po sadržaju i nacionalnu u obliku ” (Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, vol. 㺩, str. 𧍓, Moskva 1939.).

Ovi su redovi tiskani prije dvije godine 1939. i#8211. godine pakta Staljin-Hitler. Sada Staljin podsjeća Volge Nijemce da je car pronašao emulator.
 

Pozadina Nijemaca s Volge

Njemačka naselja na Volgi datiraju iz sredine osamnaestog stoljeća kada je Katarina Velika pozvala strance da se tamo nastane. Duboko u unutrašnjosti zemlje, ovo područje od 28.000 četvornih kilometara, sada graniči sa Saratovom i Staljingradom oblasti (područja), danas je još udaljeniji od arene vojnih operacija nego što je to bilo u vrijeme cara Nikole. Prvobitni doseljenici uglavnom su došli – između 1764. i 1864. – iz Vestfalije, Bavarske, Saske, Švapske, Alzas-Lorene i Švicarske. Privilegije koje su im prvotno dodijeljene postupno su nestale. Prilikom izbijanja prvog imperijalističkog pokolja njihov je status bio status druge potlačene nacionalnosti u onome što je Lenjin nazvao "carskim zatvorom nacija".#Oktobarska revolucija ih je emancipirala.

Volški Nijemci među prvima su dobili autonomiju u federaciji sovjetskih republika. 19. listopada 1918. Lenjin je potpisao dekret o uspostavi autonomije oblast (područje) Volških Nijemaca. Staljin je tada bio komesar za narodnosti. Gore citirani članak u Sovjetska enciklopedija ne propušta naglasiti da:

Drug#Staljin je od samog početka veliku pažnju posvetio pitanju samoodređenja Volških Nijemaca. ”

Ovi potomci izvornih kolonista ustrajno su se borili protiv bijele garde. O razmjeru njihova sudjelovanja u Građanskom ratu može se procijeniti činjenica da je u posljednjoj godini građanskog rata broj stanovnika ovog područja pao sa 453.000 1920. na manje od 350.000 1921. godine, odnosno gubitak veći od 20 posto. Godine 1926. službeno je osnovana Autonomna njemačka socijalistička republika Volga.

Prema službenim podacima iz 1936. godine, na ovom je području živjelo oko 500.000 stanovnika, od čega je nešto manje od dvije trećine (66,4 posto) njemačkog podrijetla 20,4 posto, Rusa i 12 posto Ukrajinaca. Danas u ovoj regiji nema više od 300.000 stanovnika njemačkog porijekla čiji je napredak jedan od hvalisanja Staljinovog režima.
 

Što su staljinisti rekli jučer

Seljaci iz Volge, njemačkog porijekla, tek su jučer proglašeni uzorima kolektivne poljoprivrede. Staljinističke priče o uspjesima mehanizirane poljoprivrede na ovom području ispunile bi čitavu knjižnicu. Dovoljno je navesti stereotipne panegirike s kojima se članak u Sovjetska enciklopedija zaključuje:

“ Daljnji razvoj nacionalne ekonomije i kulture Volške Njemačke Autonomne Socijalističke Republike i njezin brzi napredak ka boljem i još sretnijem životu zajamčeni su Staljinističkim ustavom, čvrstim staljinističkim vodstvom Središnjeg komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza i bezgraničnom predanošću trudbenika Autonomne Volške Njemačke Socijalističke Republike stvari komunizma. ”

1941. ova Autonomna Republika je ukinuta kao opasnost za državu. Kakvo priznanje bankrota!

Danas Staljin krši članak 13. svoje vlastite Ustava koja jamči prava nacionalnih manjina. Zašto? Službeno objašnjenje glasi:

“Prema pouzdanim informacijama koje su primile vojne vlasti, tisuće i deseci tisuća diverzanata i špijuna među njemačkim stanovništvom Volge spremni su izazvati eksplozije u tim regijama na signal Njemačke. ” (N.Y. Times, 8. rujna)

Dopustimo na trenutak da Kremlj, suprotno svom običaju, ovaj put govori istinu. Može li biti veće osude Staljinovog režima od ovog priznanja da nakon svih uspjeha ostaje na tisuće, ne, na desetke tisuća koji čekaju samo signal nacista da ustanu protiv sovjetske vlasti? Zašto bi se lojalnost ovih tisuća ljudi mogla tako lako pokolebati? Koji je bolji materijal za propagandu mogao očekivati ​​Hitler od onog koji mu je sada dostavio Kremlj?

I ovaj ukase dolazi nakon uvjeravanja svih Staljinovih prostitutki koje su pisale da su njegove čistke krvi i njegovi sklopovi iskorijenili neprijatelje ljudi. ”
 

Ispovijest GPU -a

The Times otprema koja se odnosi na objava protiv Nijemaca s Volge sadrži sljedeći komentar, koji su donijeli cenzorski kremlji:

“Ni jedan Nijemac s Volge nije prijavio postojanje navodno velikog broja neistomišljenika koji su otkriveni. ”

Ova jezgrovita izjava otkriva jednako koliko i formule iz Kremlja koje govore o “diverzionistima ” i “ špijunima. ”

Ovdje imamo službeno priznanje da je G.P.U. otkriva “disidente ” u velikom broju. Na jeziku Kremlja, svi disidenti, svi koji kritiziraju Staljina, su diverzanti i špijuni. ” Danas se otkrivaju u regiji Volge. A sutra?

The objava od 28. kolovoza predstavlja “upozorenje ” svim disidentima da će doživjeti sudbinu Nijemaca s Volge. Od sada će svaki disident gdje god bude otkriven ” biti službeno povezan s “ diverzantima i špijunima. ” Masovnim protjerivanjem ovih sirijskih koza iz Volga u Sibir, Staljin nastoji raspirivati ​​rasnu mržnju, a time i kao pokriće za pripremu tla za slične masovne čistke u drugim područjima.

No, ujedno i najnoviji objava Kremlja otkriva da se protivljenje birokratskom režimu povećava među stanovništvom. Sovjetske mase herojski brane Sovjetski Savez. Oni se ne bore za ovjekovječenje birokrata.


4. rujna 1941. - Povijest

Konferencija u Kremlju 30. srpnja 1941., od 18:30 do 20:30, između Harryja L. Hopkinsa i gospodina Staljina

Također su bili prisutni veleposlanik Steinhardt i gospodin Reinhardt, 53 američki tumač

Rekao sam gospodinu Staljinu da sam došao kao osobni predstavnik predsjednika. Predsjednik je Hitlera smatrao neprijateljem čovječanstva i stoga je želio pomoći Sovjetskom Savezu u njegovoj borbi protiv Njemačke.

Rekao sam mu da moja misija nije diplomatska u smislu da ne predlažem nikakvo formalno razumijevanje bilo koje vrste ili karaktera.

Izrazio sam mu predsjednikovo uvjerenje da je najvažnije što treba učiniti u svijetu danas poraziti Hitlera i hitlerizam. [Stranica 803] Impresionirao sam ga odlučnošću predsjednika i naše vlade da Sovjetskom Savezu pruže svu moguću pomoć u najkraćem mogućem roku.

Rekao sam gospodinu Staljinu da imam određene osobne poruke predsjednika 54 i objasnio svoj odnos Upravi u Washingtonu. Dalje sam mu rekao da sam upravo napustio gospodina Churchilla u Londonu koji je želio da mu prenesem osjećaje koje sam već izrazio od predsjednika.

G. Staljin je rekao da mi je poželio dobrodošlicu u Sovjetski Savez jer je već bio obaviješten o mojoj posjeti.

Opisujući Hitlera i Njemačku, g. Staljin je govorio o nužnosti postojanja minimalnog moralnog standarda među svim narodima i bez takvog minimalnog moralnog standarda nacije ne bi mogle postojati zajedno. Izjavio je da sadašnji čelnici Njemačke ne poznaju takve minimalne moralne standarde i da stoga predstavljaju antisocijalnu snagu u sadašnjem svijetu. Nijemci su bili narod, rekao je, koji bi bez razmišljanja danas potpisao ugovor, sutra ga prekršio, a drugi dan potpisao drugi. Nacije moraju ispuniti svoje ugovorne obveze, rekao je, ili međunarodno društvo ne bi moglo postojati.

Kad je dovršio opći sažetak stava Sovjetskog Saveza prema Njemačkoj, rekao je "stoga se naši pogledi podudaraju".

Rekao sam gospodinu Staljinu da je pitanje pomoći Sovjetskom Savezu podijeljeno na dva dijela. Prvo, što bi Rusija najviše zahtijevala da Sjedinjene Države mogu isporučiti odmah, i drugo, koji bi bili zahtjevi Rusije na temelju dugog rata?

Staljin je u prvu kategoriju naveo hitnu potrebu, prvo, protuzračnih topova srednjeg kalibra, od 20 do 37 mm, zajedno sa streljivom. Izjavio je da su mu takvi topovi srednjeg kalibra potrebni zbog brzine vatre i njihove pokretljivosti. Izjavio je da mu je sve skupa potrebno približno 20.000 komada protuzračnog topništva, velikog i malog. Vjerovao je da bi, ako bi mogao nabaviti takvu količinu, odmah pustio gotovo 2.000 progoniteljskih brodova koji su danas potrebni za zaštitu vojnih ciljeva iza sovjetskih linija, a takvi se zrakoplovi, ako se puste, mogu koristiti kao napadačke snage protiv neprijatelja.

  • Drugo, tražio je mitraljeze velikih dimenzija za obranu svojih gradova.
  • Treće, rekao je da je čuo da u Sjedinjenim Državama postoji mnogo pušaka i vjeruje da njihov kalibar odgovara kalibru koji se koristio u njegovoj vojsci. Izjavio je da mu treba milijun ili više takvih pušaka. Pitao sam gospodina Staljina treba li mu municije za ove puške, a on mi je odgovorio da ako je kalibar isti kao onaj koji je koristila Crvena armija "imamo dosta".

U drugoj kategoriji, naime, zalihama potrebnim za rat na velikim udaljenostima, spomenuo je prvi visokooktanski zrakoplovni benzin, drugi, aluminij za izgradnju aviona i, treće, ostale stavke koje su već spomenute na popisu koji je predstavljen našoj Vladi u Washingtonu .

U ovom trenutku razgovora g. Staljin je iznenada primijetio: "Dajte nam protuzračne topove i aluminij i možemo se boriti tri ili četiri godine."

Referirao sam se na 200 Curtissovih P -40 koji se isporučuju Sovjetskom Savezu i u odgovoru na pitanje gospodina Staljina potvrdio sam činjenicu da je 140 isporučeno putem Engleske, a 60 iz Sjedinjenih Država.

U vezi s isporukom ovih aviona, osvrnuo sam se na prisutnost poručnika Alison 55 u Moskvi i rekao da je izvanredan stručnjak za rad ove vrste aviona. Pitao sam bi li mu bilo stalo da poručnik Alison bude savjetnički postavljen u Arhanđelu, na što je gospodin Staljin potvrdno odgovorio.

Gospodin Staljin izjavio je da bi mu bilo drago ako pošaljemo bilo koje tehničare u Sovjetski Savez koji će pomoći u obučavanju njegovih vlastitih zrakoplovaca za korištenje ovih aviona. Izjavio je da će nam njegovi vlastiti zrakoplovci pokazati sve o ruskoj opremi, za koju je rekao da će nam biti jako zanimljiva.

On je opširno, ali ne i detaljno opisao zrakoplove koje je imao na raspolaganju sljedećeg dana na konferenciji. G. Staljin je rekao da mu je zrakoplov posebno potreban bombarder kratkog dometa, sposoban djelovati u radijusu od 600 do 1100 kilometara ili s ukupnim dometom od 1200 do 2200 kilometara.

Pitao sam gospodina Staljina koji je po njemu najbolji put za isporuku zaliha iz Sjedinjenih Država u Sovjetski Savez. G. Staljin je izjavio da ruta Perzijskog zaljeva i Iran nije dobra zbog ograničenog kapaciteta iranskih željeznica i autocesta. Izjavio je: "Nadalje, još ne znamo stav iranske vlade o ovoj temi."

G. Staljin je izjavio da ruta Vladivostok nije povoljna. Naglasio sam opasnost da ga Japanci odsjeku, a gospodin Staljin je pak naglasio veliku udaljenost od mjesta bitke.

G. Staljin je vjerovao da je arhanđeoski put vjerojatno najpraktičniji. I Staljin i gospodin Molotov izjavili su da bi luka Arhanđeo mogla biti otvorena zimi uz pomoć ledolomaca. Gospodin Staljin je istaknuo da su jedine dvije apsolutno slobodne luke na sjeveru bile Murmansk i Kandalaksha.

Rekao sam gospodinu Staljinu da moj boravak u Moskvi mora biti kratak. Želio sam postići što je više moguće u kratkom vremenu koje mi je bilo na raspolaganju. Pitao sam gospodina Staljina želi li osobno nastaviti razgovore ili bi više volio da o nekim detaljima razgovaram s drugim predstavnicima sovjetske vlade. Rekao sam da bih se, naravno, volio izravno posavjetovati s njim, ali shvatio sam da u ovom trenutku ima mnogo obaveza. Rekao sam mu da imam neke osobne poruke od predsjednika koje želim dostaviti u odgovarajuće vrijeme.

G. Staljin je odgovorio: "Vi ste naš gost, ali morate zapovijedati." Rekao mi je da će mi biti na raspolaganju svaki dan od šest do sedam. Tada je dogovoreno da se u deset sati te noći posavjetujem s predstavnicima Crvene armije.

Ponovio sam g. Staljinu cijenjenje naroda Sjedinjenih Država na sjajnom otporu sovjetske vojske i odlučnosti predsjednika da učini sve kako bi pomogao Sovjetskom Savezu u njegovoj hrabroj borbi protiv njemačkog osvajača.

Odgovorio je g. Staljin s izrazom zahvalnosti sovjetske vlade.

Rekao sam g. Staljinu da očekujem da ću nakon mog sastanka intervjuirati predstavnike anglo-američkog tiska i upitao me ima li g. Staljin neke želje u vezi s onim što bih trebao reći ili bi više volio da se uopće ne vodi intervju. Rekao sam mu da će pod bilo kojim okolnostima priče dopisnika biti pod kontrolom njegove cenzure.

Na to je g. Staljin odgovorio da sve što bih mogao reći neće zahtijevati cenzuru od strane njegove vlade.

Izrazio sam gospodinu Molotovu svoju želju da ga pozovem i dogovoreno je da bih se trebao vidjeti s gospodinom Molotovom sljedećeg dana u tri.


The Southwestern News (Houston, Teksas), sv. 4, br. 39, Ed. 1. petak, 19. rujna 1941

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Re: Sovjeti se povlače iz Kijeva početkom rujna 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 & raquo 03. travnja 2021, 02:31

Pogrešno ste pročitali grafikon na stranici 1012, on kaže da je u prosjeku 21 dan za oporavak od bolesti 1941. Tvrdnja na str. 1014 odnosi se na bolesnike iz cijelog razdoblja od rujna 1941. do kolovoza 1942., ali grafikon kaže da su bolesni 1942. oporavio se u prosjeku nakon 40 dana. Dakle, 49% u roku od mjesec dana oporavljeno uglavnom se odnosi na bolesnike iz 1942., a ne 1941. Pretpostavljam da je većina onih u 1941. koji su bili bolesni duže vrijeme bili slučajevi promrzlina zime 1941-42. dakle uglavnom oni koji su nakon razdoblja o kojem raspravljamo.

Tablica na stranici 1020 izričito kaže samo 56.800 odlazaka zbog bolesti, pa je velika većina ostala i ako je prosječno vrijeme oporavka za 1941. godinu bilo 21 dan, tada se najmanje 50% oporavilo u roku od 21 dana, a vjerojatno najmanje 2/3 u roku od 30 Evakuirani su samo ekstremniji slučajevi bolesti. Iscrpljenost je vjerojatno bila značajan slučaj za neke ljude koji su odustali od akcije i nema naznaka da su borbena oružja bila nesrazmjerno pogođena zbog toga. Možda je čak i manja vjerojatnost da će biti pogođeni zbog žrtava koje su žvakale one koje su se mogle razboljeti i svježih zamjena za koje je manja vjerojatnost da će se razboljeti popunjavajući svoja mjesta.

Čini se da je vaša pogreška uzeta pri svakom odlasku u srpnju 1941. i pomnožena s 1,75, a ne samo sa žrtvama uzrokovanim oružjem (koje također nije uključivalo nestanak, pa ih uklonite iz svojih izračuna). Dakle, udvostručili ste sve evakuirane bolesnike i dodali u druge kategorije koje nisu trebale biti uključene.

Pa da, u osnovi ono što sam mislio, pogrešno ste pročitali vlastiti izvor.

Da bih dobio broj oboljelih, pomnožio sam s 1,75 ukupnim odlascima i došao do više od 300 000. U pravu ste da sam trebao pomnožiti s brojem ranjenih (oko 125.000 prema onome što vidim u mutnom izdanju Kindle, nemam papirnatu kopiju na bankomatu). Pomnoženje 125.000 s 1,75 daje nam 218.750 vojnika koji su bolesni u bilo kojem trenutku u srpnju (i vjerojatno sličan broj u kolovozu). Čak i ako razdoblje bolesti traje samo 21 dan, to je još uvijek više od 200 000 vojnika izvan borbe bilo kojeg dana. Što znači da je borbena snaga pješačke divizije još uvijek samo 60%, a borbena snaga pancerke i motoriziranih divizija samo 50%.

Također po ovoj temi, Sovjeti su ionako evakuirani, pa to samo olakšava posao AG-jugu i Centru, jer njihovi protivnici ionako bježe istočno od njih.

Sovjetske pričuvne vojske bile su unaprijed mobilizirane tamo gdje su bile potrebne, a to su bile Ukrajina i Lenjingrad, imale bi vremena za mobilizaciju ispred Moskve da se Staljin odlučio povući jer bi proces mobilizacije započeo znatno prije 19. kolovoza kada kažete odluka o evakuaciji bi bila donesena. Kasnije su se mogli mobilizirati po Moskvi, ali to je duži proces i proces koji se neće smatrati potrebnim sve dok ne počne evakuacija. Prekasno je za preusmjeravanje mobilizacije za kolovoz i vjerojatno većinu rujna s obzirom na to koliko će transporta biti potrebno za evakuaciju Ukrajine. Ako se išta što bi moglo samo prekinuti proces mobilizacije dok se vlakovi preusmjeravaju na spašavanje svojih armija umjesto na stvaranje novih.

Prosinac 1941. nije kolovoz 1941. Pokušavati usporediti situacije krajnje je apsurdno. Koja borba od kuće do kuće u Moskvi? Nakon Vyazme u gradu nema rezervi za borbu za Moskvu, a nema ni blata da uspori Nijemce. Nove vojske nisu bile mobilizirane u gradu, samo su prolazile kroz njega.

NAČIN ste precjenjivali sovjetske sposobnosti u kolovozu-rujnu i podcjenjivali sposobnosti AG-Centra u istom razdoblju. Možemo pogledati što se dogodilo sovjetskim snagama koje su pokušale zaustaviti Lenjingradsko i Kijevsko okruženje. Savjet: uništeni su.

U situaciji u kojoj je Moskva zauzeta u rujnu (pretpostavljam s obzirom na to da će pohod na Moskvu započeti kasnije u kolovozu) Sovjeti nemaju sposobnost premještanja rezervi za kontranapad na Moskvu, nedostajalo bi im središnje željezničko i telefonsko čvorište ( prilično vitalno za organiziranje pričuva teško je to učiniti u hodu iz Kubyshieva, planiranog novog kapitala ako vlada pobjegne na vrijeme), a nedostajala bi im industrija za proizvodnju potrebnog oružja koje je u prosincu opremilo snage u prosincu. U međuvremenu Nijemci imaju sva aerodroma u Moskvi, zarobljene zalihe i željezničke pruge/vozni park, imaju poplavu izbjeglica koji bježe na istok i u sovjetsku infrastrukturu koja ih nije mogla nositi, imaju 10% sovjetske industrije koja je bila koncentrirana oko Moskve i osigurao veliki dio specijaliziranog naoružanja i opreme koji nisu napravljeni drugdje, i što je još važnije, eliminirali su glavninu sovjetskih snaga koje bi im mogle zaprijetiti. Jedina velika preostala snaga bila bi snaga koja bježi iz Ukrajine, koja se još mora boriti s tim da ih AG-jug progoni. Lenjingradske snage su još uvijek na Lugi i sada su podijeljene između i pregleda Moskovske osi, ali sada bez željezničkih pruga za njihovo opskrbu.

Rokovi i ATLS opet se zbunjuju u ovoj temi. No, ako se samo držimo Stolfijevog ATL -a, u kojem se AGC, uključujući sve Panzer Group 2 i Panzer Group 3, vozi na istok sredinom kolovoza, tada je 11 novih sovjetskih armija koje su mobilizirane u kolovozu i 3 vojske koje su mobilizirane u Rujan (od kojih su svi osim 2 bili raspoređeni u Lenjingradu i Ukrajini u OTL -u) bio bi poslan u moskovsko kazalište. Ako napad AGC-a bude isti kao operacija Typhoon u OTL-u, okružit će 4-5 sovjetskih armija. Čak i ne računajući 14 novih armija mobiliziranih u kolovozu i rujnu, Sovjeti još uvijek imaju 5 drugih vojski u moskovskoj regiji, plus snage Središnje/Brianske fronte i snage kod Velikih Luki koje će imati slobodne ruke u Stolfijevom ATL -u jer Panzer Grupe 2 i 3 ih ne napadaju. Izvor za mobilizaciju sovjetskih armija je Karta 2 iz Davida Glantza Barbarossa.

Molimo objasnite kako okruženje 4-5 sovjetskih armija krajem kolovoza/početkom rujna dovodi do pada Moskve u rujnu, s obzirom na više od 20 drugih armija koje će Sovjeti moći dodijeliti za suprotstavljanje ovoj ofenzivi (prije nego što stigne još 5 sovjetskih armija u listopadu, a još 11 stiže u studenom-prosincu)?

Također imajte na umu da je Grupa armija Centar držala svoj dio fronta u kolovozu i rujnu gotovo bez rezervi. Kako će onda imati radnu snagu da zadrži dvije/tri strane istaknute strane koja strši prema Moskvi, protiv 20+ sovjetskih armija? Kad je to pokušao u OTL -u u prosincu, bio je prisiljen povući se.

Re: Sovjeti se povlače iz Kijeva početkom rujna 1941

Objavio / la autor KDF33 & raquo 03. travnja 2021, 03:30

1,2 milijuna muškaraca. Registrirani borbeni i neborbeni gubici za lipanj-kolovoz iznosili su 500.859, a zamjene 215.000, uključujući 40.000 ne evakuiranih rekonvalescenata.

To je čisti gubitak od 285.859 ljudi. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor History Learner » 03 Apr 2021, 03:35

I have. Stolfi is hardly a reputable source. The paragraph you have quoted contains no archival data on readiness. Stolfi's figure of 72% of the initial "striking power" of 2,792 operational tanks on August 13th is backed by nothing, and would require us to believe German tanks had a 74% readiness rate at the time.

How he derives his figures is anyone's guess, but it is clearly contradicted by strength reports, which, as I have shown previously, indicate far lower levels of operational readiness among long-engaged Panzer formations.

Beyond that though, using figures from September-while 3rd and 2nd Panzer were getting use by AGN and AGS-for a mid/late August estimate is a pretty bad standard. Looking at your data, you're pulling it from Panzertruppen by Jentz, which makes it all the more odd because August returns are presented for several of the divisions, but also I am not sure why you are citing them the way you are?

Case in point is 3rd Panzer, which started Barbarossa with 229 tanks and by September 4th total losses were only 70, meaning that even in September, they had a roughly 70% rate of tanks either in operation or repairable. If we take your suggestion of a few days halt, most-if not all-of those under repair would be put back in position. However, as stated, looking at September returns seems odd to me.

  • XXXIX. Armeekorps (mot.): En route to Heeresgruppe Nord, s 12. Panzer , kao i 18. and 20. Infanterie (mot.)
  • LVII. Armeekorps (mot.): 3 days away (22 August) from launching an attack on Velikiye Luki, with 19. and 20. Panzer
  • VIII. Armeekorps: Defending north-east of Smolensk, with 7. Panzer , kao i 14. Infanterie (mot.)
  • XXXXVI. Armeekorps (mot.): Defending south-east of Smolensk, with 10. Panzer , kao i Das Reich
  • XXXXVII. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 13th Army and holding the right flank of Panzergruppe 2, s 17. and 18. Panzer , kao i 29. Infanterie (mot.)
  • XXIV. Armeekorps (mot.): Pushing south against 21st Army and about to take Starodub, with 3. and 4. Panzer , kao i 10. Infanterie (mot.)

1. You still have produced no data on the impact of the loss of Moscow on Heeresgruppe Nord. Your assertions regarding supply are speculation.

To buttress your claim, you would need to:

1. Detail the amount of supplies needed by the northern Fronts.
2. Detail the capacity of the remaining railways.

As for Glantz, you're misconstruing his claim. The importance of Tikhvin lay in constituting the last remaining link with the USSR in general, not just with Moscow. He was also speaking of the cut off Leningrad Front. In this scenario of ours, no Soviet forces are cut off in the north.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 04:07

1.2 million men. Registered combat and non-combat losses for June - August amounted to 500,859, and replacements to 215,000, including 40,000 non-evacuated convalescents.

That's a net loss of 285,859 men. Even if we assume that 100% of the casualties occurred among personnel included in the Kampfstärke, that still leaves 914,141 men - 76% of the initial figure.

At the end of July 1941 the German army in the east had already sustained more casualties than during the whole of the campaign in the west. By mid-September 10 per cent of the 142 divisions involved in the campaign against the Soviet Union had lost over 25 per cent of their strength of June 1941. In 28 per cent of the divisions the losses were over 20 per cent, while in another 21 per cent the losses were 12 per cent or higher. Barely half of the divisions employed had suffered casualties of less than 12 per cent. Owing to the tremendous wastage, measured according to the operational capability of men and material, the combat strength of the divisions had been reduced still further. In the second half of August it fell to 60 per cent among the infantry divisions, and to 50 per cent among the mobile troops.

Bernhard R. Kroener Rolf-Dieter Muller Hans Umbreit. Germany and the Second World War: 5 (Germany & Second World War) . OUP Oxford. Izdanje za Kindle.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 04:08

I'm not misconstructing them, given I directly cited it with picture evidence so there could be no claim of me misquoting him. He directly notes the loss of the railway links with Moscow-he directly specifies Moscow, not the USSR as a whole-would be fatal.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor KDF33 » 03 Apr 2021, 07:38

The entire quote is this: "[Leeb] was to attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to Moscow and completely encircle the city."

As far as he's shown, he feels this single quote validates his view that, without Moscow, the entire northern direction would collapse.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor stg 44 » 03 Apr 2021, 15:42

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

The timelines and ATLS are, again, getting confused in this thread. But if we just stick to Stolfi's ATL, in which AGC, including all of Panzer Group 2 and Panzer Group 3, drive east in the middle of August, then the 11 new Soviet armies that were mobilized in August and 3 armies that were mobilized in September (all but 2 of which were deployed to Leningrad and Ukraine in the OTL), would have been sent to the Moscow theater. If AGC's assault performs as well as Operation Typhoon did in the OTL, then it will encircle 4-5 Soviet Armies. Even not counting the 14 new armies mobilized in August and September, the Soviets still have 5 other armies in the Moscow region, plus the forces of the Central/Briansk Front and forces at Velikiye Luki that will have a free hand in Stolfi's ATL because Panzer Groups 2 and 3 aren't attacking them. Source for mobilization of Soviet armies is Map 2 in David Glantz's Barbarossa.

Please explain how the encirclement of 4-5 Soviet armies in late August/early September leads to Moscow falling in September, given the more than 20 other armies that the Soviets will be able to assign to countering this offensive (before another 5 Soviet armies arrive in October, and another 11 arrive in November-December)?

Also note that Army Group Center was holding its portion of the front in August and September with almost no reserves. How is it then going to have the manpower to hold the two/three sides of a salient protruding toward Moscow, against 20+ Soviet armies? When it tried this in the OTL in December, it was forced to retreat.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 03 Apr 2021, 18:20

For September the chart says about 99,000 wounded. It is over 100,000 for August.
Again though remember that within the same month the majority of the sick would have recovered and returned to their units and never even left their armies only about a quarter were evacuated and they are already present in the chart.

I hate to break it to you, but your math doesn't check out for the 50 and 60% even with the sick.

As an aside I read more of Askey's book and he claims that the numbers in the chart we're discussing on p.1020 is in error and that the 509,000 arrivals in 1941 are actually just recovered wounded and sick, not replacements. He bases that claim on using the medical data in the chart on p.1012 and adding up all the sick and wounded for 1941 and using the recovery rate data he gets to about 509,000 recovered for the year with then over 545,000 replacements on top of that. I don't necessarily think he's right, but given that the DRZW uses some dubious numbers like the 50% and 60% states based on a letter sent to Halder by another officer without any context in a single throw away line in the text, maybe his argument has some merit.

The conclusion that by late August 1941 the combat strength of German infantry divisions was down to 60%, and that of mobile divisions was down to 50%, is made by Bernhard R. Kroener. Kroener is a native German whose father was an officer during WW2 and later a ministerial director for the German ministry of defense. Kroener served in the German armed forces, studied military history at the Sorbonne, worked for the German Military History Research Office, taught at the University of Freiburg, published extensively, and taught from 1997 to 2013 as a professor for military history at the Historical Institute of the University of Potsdam where he held the chair in military history. From 2004 to 2010, Kroener was dean of the Philosophical Faculty, set up the “Military Studies” master’s course at the University of Potsdam, and has a long list of students who are themselves academic professors of history.

The claim that Kroener is wrong is made by Nigel Askey . a guy with a bachelors degree from the University of Sussex . who served as a consultant for a video game about the eastern front. I'll let the readers of this thread form their own judgment about who to trust.

Guderian drove south non-stop through August and into September. On August 8th he completed the destruction of the Soviet 28th army in his march south to Roslavl and then helped with the destruction of further Soviet forces in the Central Front on the 12th-14th during the Gomel fighting, and then continued further south. So Guderian would be driving south as of August 19th in this scenario because that is what he was already doing historically, though most of his army was still further north and it was a couple of corps that were pushing south while the rest were securing the flank and waiting for clarification from Hitler about where to go, east or south. So they could effectively turn on a dime if given the order to head east/northeast from Roslavl and the corps helping destroy Central Front could return north pretty quickly. At that point then there would be no threat to AG-Center from the south and 2nd army under von Weichs could maintain the pressure by continuing the march south as they already were.

So the pressure would be on, Central Front would be collapsing per OTL, and Guderian's forces would be able to switch to the East as soon as the order was given. And again you're completely discounting the collapsing position of SW Front on the Dniepr as a reason to get out of Ukraine. Otherwise why would Kiev be evacuated in August/early September? As to the reserve armies it seems like you completely just ignored my point about them needing to be mobilized in a specific point well in advance of their ability to become operational, so the Soviets cannot simply divert them on a dime, they'd need to select a mobilization point a month in advance and go with that, so reserve armies of August and most of September would already have their mobilization points set and changing them would disrupt the entire process and result in major delays, not least of which is due to the need to evacuate Ukraine. If they don't evacuate Ukraine though due to AG-Center attacking East then the new armies are still already set in their mobilization points unless STAVKA really wanted to introduce the disruption and delays from switching them in the process, as they'd have to then completely rework their train schedules and hope they can redirect trains already in motion plus move out units already showing up in their original mobilization sectors.

All of the 11 armies would have had their mobilization points set so couldn't shift without badly disrupting the entire mobilization process and introducing major delays while then the Fronts that were supposed to get them would be deprived of them at vital moments. I might give you the September armies being able to be diverted since there were so few of them, but then they arrive in time to be swept up in the retreat/defeat as there would be no mud to stall the Germans like in October. Soviet reserve armies did not perform well with limited time to organize after being officially mobilized sometimes even with time they didn't do well, see the Reserve Front and the militia divisions.

Unfortunately your scenario for the Soviets requires them to have a teleportation device, which seems to be why you're having a problem understanding why it was impossible for the Soviets to achieve what you're claiming. You're also forgetting that historically it wasn't just 5 armies lost to the Soviets in Typhoon, but rather 1 million men out of the 1.25 million they had defending Moscow (that's from Glantz and a Russian historian citing actual Soviet sources). Technically HQs survived, but basically without men or equipment, so they were rendered useless for a while even if still technically existing on paper. You're getting into Hitler in the Berlin Bunker in April 1945 territory moving paper armies around. Also again December 1941 is not August-September 1941.

Since you have dropped Stolfi's mid-August plunge for Moscow, I will focus on the ATL originally set up in this thread. According to Glantz's Barbarossa, Hitler made the decision to send Guderian's Panzer Group 2 to the Ukraine on August 18. The directive did not reach Bock at Army Group Center until August 23. Guderian returned from his personal appeal to Hitler on August 24. Meanwhile, Kirponos and the Soviet Stavka identified the growing threat to Southwestern Front's northern flank on August 18. On August 19, Soviet 5th Army was ordered to retreat across the Dnepr, while Soviet 37th Army was ordered to hold the western bank at Kiev. On August 26, Guderian's Panzer Group 2 reached Shostka and Korop, disrupting the three Soviet Armies that were deployed there to halt his advance. Guderian approached the Desna River on August 30 and crossed it on September 3.

Even if Stalin had ordered the 37th Army to retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnepr on August 18, that alone would not have caused Hitler to order Guderian to halt his advance south. Even if, as the threat from Guderian became apparent on August 26, Stalin had ordered the entire Soviet Southwestern Front to withdraw from its salient and abandon Kiev, that would not cause Hitler to change his directive for Guderian to drive south. Hitler still wanted the Ukraine for economic reasons and would have insisted on it being captured. The withdrawal of the Soviet Southwestern Front at this early date would mean that Guderian would be driving into the retreating Soviet forces as he drove south. His panzer group would have been bogged down in fighting east of Kiev for weeks, just as he was in the OTL, only this time he's not fighting encircled Red Army units who are simply trying to flee east.

So there really is no room in the ATL originally proposed in this thread for an advance on Moscow any time earlier than when it actually took place in the OTL at the start of October.


Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor KDF33 » 31 Mar 2021, 16:00

I have seen that. That's one of the most egregious mistakes made by Askey. The idea that the Ostheer was short by just 223,587 men at the end of the year is ludicrous, and also contradicted by German primary documents detailing the Iststärke of their armies:

June 1941: 2,765,276
July: 2,650,626
August: 2,579,879
September: 2,539,110
October: 2,381,347
November: 2,362,463
December: 2,112,002

Strength decreases by a little over 100,000 per month, which matches known casualties and replacements.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor stg 44 » 31 Mar 2021, 16:56

Your chart doesn't cover most of 1941 though, just December and on and is different than the one that HG posted.
The DRZW chart that historygeek posted did include wounded returned estimates them at exactly 20,000 per month every month. Askey has a larger, more complex estimate with justifications for his calculations.

It isn't simply returned wounded that came back though, but also the sick and people out for other reasons. Not only that but the Genesene AFAIK doesn't cover returned wounded who were not evacuated from the theater for longer term treatment, which only included those that took 8 weeks or more to recover (IIRC the number of weeks). So some wounded counted as casualties, but were not evacuated and only later returned, but stayed with the army for a shorter recovery before returning to their units. German casualty accounting is rather complex.

I have seen that. That's one of the most egregious mistakes made by Askey. The idea that the Ostheer was short by just 223,587 men at the end of the year is ludicrous, and also contradicted by German primary documents detailing the Iststärke of their armies:

June 1941: 2,765,276
July: 2,650,626
August: 2,579,879
September: 2,539,110
October: 2,381,347
November: 2,362,463
December: 2,112,002

Strength decreases by a little over 100,000 per month, which matches known casualties and replacements.

Iststärke (actual strength)
The Iststärke, usually written as Ist (is), was the actual number of personnel supported by the unit, regardless of their status. This included personnel on leave, lend out to other units, and those wounded or fallen sich in the past eight weeks.

The difference between the Soll and the Ist was referred to as Fehlstellen (unfilled positions), usually written as Fehl. If a unit was overstrength, it was referred to as über Soll (in excess of authorized strength). It could be possible for a unit to have one section that had unfilled positions and another that was overstrength, but the Fehl only counted the net difference.

So units in June might not have been the actual numbers on hand and later on corrected downwards.
Why the drop off in September-October given the relative dearth of fighting? 150k is a lot since there was a LOT of fighting in August to September, but only a 40k drop off.

Qvist noted something similar for 1942 in the link you provided:

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 31 Mar 2021, 21:48

800,000 men out of a total of

3 million. Given how just the 88 Infanterie divisions deployed had an establishment strength of 858,000 men in their infantry regiments, I don't see how this can be true, unless the definition of "combat strength" used is ridiculously narrow.

Kampfstärke (combat strength)

The Kampfstärke was the strength of the personnel available for actual combat. This excluded the drivers of all non-combat vehicles, horse keepers, administrative personnel, staff of artillery and mortar regiments, and staff of tank destroyer and engineer battalions. Excluded was also signal personnel that did not work either directly alongside, or received signals from, units that were part of the combat strength.

The number included the staff companies at the regimental level and below, messengers, field replacement units, as well as field medical personnel.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 31 Mar 2021, 22:41

How do you arrive at the 90% replacement figure? This chart from DRZW Volume V shows that only 23% of OstHeer losses were replaced through July 1941, and only 37% through August 1941.

DRZW states that by the second half of August, the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60 percent, and that of the mobile divisions had fallen to 50%.

Fair question, the answer is that the number you quote doesn't cover all replacements, especially all those in the 'march battalions'. Those on average had 790 per battalion before the fighting even started. For AG-North 24 of their 28 divisions had such a battalion. They covered a bit over 2/3rds of AG-North's losses in June and July. On top of that AG-North received 35,000 replacements from June-August and another 20,000 in September. In their situation this meant that the average infantry battalion was still at 78% strength by October and for motorized battalions it was 82% as their losses were generally lower and they were favored for replacements. That's based on averages given replacements and casualties for the AG. That is all from Liedtke's "Enduring the Whirlwind". AG-North still had 73% of their starting armor strength during the encirclement of Leningrad in September.

AG-Center was doing even better with 161,340 replacements including those from the march battalions vs. 198,398 casualties, so nearly 82% of casualties replaced. Liedtke does some maths and comes up with the figure of over 90% of combat strength retained assuming all replacements were directed toward combat battalions.

Also remember none of those numbers covers wounded returning to units, which were not counted as replacements. This is where Nigel Askey's books come in as he covers the full spectrum of losses (including sick and unfit for non-combat reasons, which was nearly 400,000 men by the end of December) and recovered/replacements 509,000 sick/wounded men were returned to units from July-December 1941, so counting replacements/recuperated vs. all losses for Barbarossa forces there was only a shortage of 223,587 men by the end of December 1941, aka considerably less than 10% of Barbarossa forces. P.178 of his volume IIB of the Operation Barbarossa series with a table breaking everything down by month.

DRZW apparently only counts a very specific category of replacement and makes some very flawed assumptions based on that.

According to DRZW, there were only 90,000 men in field replacement battalions at the start of the campaign. Despite using them all up, there were still 132,000 vacancies in the OstHeer at the start of August.

Even if we include the 20,000 recovered wounded each month, that is still a replacement rate of only 37.9% by the end of July, and 50.34% by the end of August (and this does not taken into account the massive numbers of sick OstHeer personnel who were not evacuated to rear areas).

We are left with the inescapable conclusion of DRZW that by the end of August the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60%, and the combat strength of the panzer and motorized divisions had fallen to 50%.

Thus, Stolfi's proposal for Army Group Center to dash ahead into the most powerful concentration of Soviet forces on the Eastern Front, leaving Army Group North and Army Group South to stall out their advances, thereby creating a massive salient stretching from Gomel to Moscow and then back to Velikiye Luki, while the Soviet Union is pouring all its newly created reserve armies around the flanks of an overstretched and badly understrength Army Group Center . seems like a recipe for the disaster at Stalingrad to take place a year earlier at Moscow.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor stg 44 » 01 Apr 2021, 16:09

AG-North would be helping by destroying the Northwest Front and 22nd army of the Western Front on the flank of AG-Center while the majority of the infantry corps hold the Luga Line. AG-South would breach the Dniepr line and exploit that breach per OTL, which was achieved without the help of Guderian since his forces only fought Central and Bryansk Fronts to that point. It was only during the exploitation phase of AG-South's breach of the Dniepr line that Guderian started hitting Southwest Front from the north, but AG-South didn't necessarily need their help, Guderian just sped up the collapse of SW Front. So the flanks wouldn't be stalled or endangered given that Guderian and von Weichs defeated Central and Bryansk Front historically and would be fighting them on the flank here too while helping close/liquidate the Vyazma pocket in August. At that point Central Front was basically defeated anyway and being overrun by von Weichs while Bryansk Front was still forming and what units it did throw against Guderian's flank in his march to Ukraine in August-September were defeated with little effort.

Any reserve armies being created, most of which were immediately occupied against AG-North and South anyway, would be of limited ability to attack and given their history during defense they aren't particularly combat capable, just speed bumps. So the flank threat is heavily exaggerated given actual Soviet historical combat capabilities. Read Glantz's Stumbling Colossus about how bad things were in June and then realize by August Soviet abilities had degraded to levels much worse than even in June and they were desperately throwing the kitchen sink at German forces to little/no avail.

I hate to break it to you, but August 1941 is not November 1942, not least of which due to the lack of experience, Lend-Lease (didn't start until October), and a well grooved mobilization system. Nor is the German army anywhere near as worn down in August-September 1941 as they were by November 1942 after the fighting in Stalingrad and the preceding 16 months worth of losses. You're vastly overestimating Soviet capabilities and overstating German losses.

Re: The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

Objavio / la autor historygeek2021 » 01 Apr 2021, 22:01

Which are not counted as replacements in the chart or most sources discussing Barbarossa replacement flows. Can you cite the page in the book with the number of vacancies so I can see the context? Out of a starting force of nominally over 3 million men 132,000 vacancies is extremely low given the scale of the fighting to that point and results achieved. Even taking KDF's Iststarke number for June of 2.7 million that is 4.8% meaning as of August Barbarossa forces were still at 95.2% of their pre-invasion strength. That is even higher than what I claimed.

As I read the chart it says an estimated 20,000 returned combat wounded (not sick or unfit for non-combat causes) of men treated within their armies who were never evacuated. That is on top of recuperated wounded who left their armies for longer term treatment and were shipped back in later, which Askey claims is a specific number per month I have sent him an email so as soon as I get clarification for his source on the claimed number of returned recovered I will post the info here. Askey did document the number of sick/unfit in total, which was about 395,000 from June-December 1941. Over 90% of them returned to their units in less than 30 days.

I don't see how that is accurate given that 132,000 vacancies in August is only 4.8% of the Iststarke of June. Also you haven't demonstrated that all the vacancies were in combat arms either or that it was for infantry in particular. What page of the DRZW volume are you citing for those percentages?

The discussion of the OstHeer's manpower problems begins on page 1009 of Volume V/IB. The cite for combat strength is page 1011.

On page 1014, DRZW states that only 49% of sick troops returned to duty within one month, and another 23% after 2 months.

If you compare the charts on page 1112 (ratio of sick to wounded) and page 1020 (departures and arrivals), you will see that the number of sick in July was roughly 1.75 times the number of wounded, which gives roughly another 300,000 men each month who were out of action due to sickness. Even if most of them returned to readiness in a month or two, there are still roughly 300,000 cases of sickness each month - 300,000 men on top of wounded, missing and killed who are not able to participate in combat.

AG-North would be helping by destroying the Northwest Front and 22nd army of the Western Front on the flank of AG-Center while the majority of the infantry corps hold the Luga Line. AG-South would breach the Dniepr line and exploit that breach per OTL, which was achieved without the help of Guderian since his forces only fought Central and Bryansk Fronts to that point. It was only during the exploitation phase of AG-South's breach of the Dniepr line that Guderian started hitting Southwest Front from the north, but AG-South didn't necessarily need their help, Guderian just sped up the collapse of SW Front. So the flanks wouldn't be stalled or endangered given that Guderian and von Weichs defeated Central and Bryansk Front historically and would be fighting them on the flank here too while helping close/liquidate the Vyazma pocket in August. At that point Central Front was basically defeated anyway and being overrun by von Weichs while Bryansk Front was still forming and what units it did throw against Guderian's flank in his march to Ukraine in August-September were defeated with little effort.

Any reserve armies being created, most of which were immediately occupied against AG-North and South anyway, would be of limited ability to attack and given their history during defense they aren't particularly combat capable, just speed bumps. So the flank threat is heavily exaggerated given actual Soviet historical combat capabilities. Read Glantz's Stumbling Colossus about how bad things were in June and then realize by August Soviet abilities had degraded to levels much worse than even in June and they were desperately throwing the kitchen sink at German forces to little/no avail.

AG North couldn't even destroy the Northwest Front in the OTL when it had the help of Panzer Group 3.

AG South was stretched out trying to find a point on the Dnepr to break through. Its breakthrough at Dneptrotovsk was struggling under Soviet counter-attacks in much the same way as the AGC was at Yelnia (Stahell discusses this in his book on Kiev). In the absence of Guderian's Panzer Group 2, the AG South's bridgehead at Kremenchug was planned to be used for the aid of the panzer corps struggling at Dnepropetrovsk. Zeitzler estimated the combat strength of Panzer Group 1 in early September to be down to one third. Maybe AGS would have captured Dnepropetrovsk, but that would just be extending AG South's salient even further to the east, at a time when the Red Army's strength was rapidly increasing and the OstHeer's was diminishing.

The Soviet reserve armies went where the Germans were attacking. In the OTL, this was Leningrad and the Ukraine. In Solfi's ATL, it would be against AG Center, which the Soviet reserve armies successfully bludgeoned to a halt at Smolensk in the OTL and would do the same in Solfi's ATL. AGC might keep pushing east, but its flanks would get longer and longer while its combat strength got weaker and weaker, while the Red Army's strength got stronger and stronger (thanks to the Southwestern Front not being destroyed in this ATL and no encirclement at Briansk).

Perhaps you should look at what happened to the OstHeer when it overextended in December 1941. Now picture an AGC bogged down in house to house fighting in and around Moscow, the Soviets securely holding Leningrad, and the Southwestern Front intact. All while AGC is holding a long, narrow corridor from Smolensk to Moscow. In the OTL, the Germans could not hold their overextended positions. Why would they be able to do so in Stolfi's ATL?

Even if Germany somehow does hold the Moscow salient, where does that leave the OstHeer in 1942? By May 1942 the Red Army had 5.4 milliion men at the front, and they would be even stronger in this ATL without the encirclements at Kiev and Briansk and the Sea of Azov. Germany only had 2.5 million men at the front in May 1942. How do 2.5 million Germans hold a front with long, narrow salients protruding toward Moscow and Dnepropetrovsk against 5.4 million Red Army soldiers (whose numbers are growing every month)? November 1942 is still coming. The Red Army is still getting stronger. What has Stolfi's ATL accomplished, even if the Germans succeed in capturing and holding Moscow?


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