Američke žrtve u operaciji Iračka sloboda srpanj 2003. - Povijest

Američke žrtve u operaciji Iračka sloboda srpanj 2003. - Povijest



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Američke žrtve u operaciji Iračka sloboda Srpnja 2003

Ukupne žrtve47
Član uslugeDobDatum
1. narednik Christopher D. Kovčeg511. srpnja 2003
Cpl. Travis J. Bradach-Nall212. srpnja 2003. godine
Pfc. Corey L. Small202. srpnja 2003. godine
Pfc. Edward James Herrgott203. srpnja 2003. godine
Narednik David B. Parson306. srpnja 2003
Spc. Jeffrey M. Wershow226. srpnja 2003
Narednik osoblja Barry Sanford, stariji467. srpnja 2003
Narednik Chad L. Keith217. srpnja 2003
Narednik 1. klasa Craig A. Boling388. srpnja 2003
Pvt. Robert L. McKinley238. srpnja 2003
Narednik Roger D. Rowe549. srpnja 2003
Narednik Dan I. klase Dan Henry Gabrielson399. srpnja 2003
Lance Cpl. Jason Andrew Tetrault209. srpnja 2003
Narednik Melissa Valles269. srpnja 2003
Spc. Christian Schultz2011. srpnja 2003
Spc. Joshua M. Neusche2012. srpnja 2003
Narednik Jaror C. Puello-Coronado3613. srpnja 2003
Cpt. Paul J. Cassidy3613. srpnja 2003
Narednik Michael T. Crockett2714. srpnja 2003
Lance Cpl. Cory Ryan Geurin1815. srpnja 2003
Spc. Ramon Reyes Torres2916. srpnja 2003
Podoficir 3. klase David J. Moreno2617. srpnja 2003
Narednik Mason Douglas Whetstone3017. srpnja 2003
Spc. Joel L. Bertoldie2018. srpnja 2003
Drugi poručnik Jonathan D. Rozier2519. srpnja 2003
Narednik Jason D. Jordan2420. srpnja 2003
Majstor narednik David A. Scott5120. srpnja 2003
Narednik Justin W. Garvey2320. srpnja 2003
Narednik Christopher R. Willoughby prve klase2920. srpnja 2003
Cpl. Mark A. Bibby2521. srpnja 2003
Spc. Jon P. Fettig3022. srpnja 2003
Spc. Brett T. Christian2723. srpnja 2003
Joshua T. Byers2923. srpnja 2003
Cpl. Evan Asa Ashcraft2424. srpnja 2003
Pfc. Raheen Tyson Heighter2224. srpnja 2003
Narednik osoblja Hector R. Perez4024. srpnja 2003
Narednik Juan M. Serrano3124. srpnja 2003
Spc. Jonathan P. Barnes2126. srpnja 2003
Pfc. Jonathan M. Cheatham1926. srpnja 2003
Narednik Daniel K. Methvin2226. srpnja 2003
Pfc. Wilfredo Perez Jr.2426. srpnja 2003
Narednik Heath A. McMillin2927. srpnja 2003
Spc. William J. Maher III3528. srpnja 2003
Narednik Nathaniel Hart Jr.2928. srpnja 2003
1. natporučnik Leif E. Nott2430. srpnja 2003
Pvt. Michael J. Deutsch2131. srpnja 2003
Spc. James I. Lambert III2231. srpnja 2003

Army Spc. Vincent Sebastian Ibarria

22, iz San Antonija, poginuo je 3. srpnja u nesreći pri prevrtanju vozila u mjestu Farah, Afganistan. Ibarria je raspoređena u 2. bojnu, 22. pješačku pukovniju, borbeni tim 1. pješačke brigade, 10. brdska divizija, Fort Drum, New York. Ibarrijine nagrade i odlikovanja uključuju medalju Nacionalne službe obrane, Medalju za globalni rat protiv terorizma, Afganistansku kampanju sa Zvijezdom kampanje, Medalju za postignuća vojske i vrpcu Službe vojske. Incident se istražuje.

Pentagon je objavio smrt vojnika poginulog u nesreći pri prevrtanju vozila u Afganistanu.

Spc. Vincent Sebastian Ibarria (21) iz San Antonija umro je 3. srpnja u Farahu u Afganistanu, navodi se u priopćenju Pentagona. Incident se istražuje.

Ibarria je raspoređena u 2. bojnu, 22. pješačku pukovniju, borbeni tim 1. pješačke brigade, 10. brdska divizija, Fort Drum, New York.

“Naše misli i molitve su s obitelji i prijateljima Spc. Vincent Ibarria u ovo teško vrijeme. Gubitak bilo kojeg brdskog vojnika ima trajan utjecaj na svakog člana tima. 10. planinska divizija oplakuje gubitak Spc. Ibarria, jako će mu nedostajati u sastavu ", rekao je potpukovnik Kamil Sztalkoper, glasnogovornik 10. planinske divizije.

Ibarrijine nagrade i odlikovanja uključuju medalju Nacionalne službe obrane, Medalju za globalni rat protiv terorizma, Afganistansku kampanju sa Zvijezdom kampanje, Medalju za postignuća vojske i vrpcu Službe vojske.


Američke žrtve u operaciji Iračka sloboda srpanj 2003. - Povijest

KUPUJTE 2. OGRANIČENU ODJELJENJU KOVAČKE ODJELJENJA & POKLONE:

"Toujours Pr & ecirct"

(Ažurirano 5-30-08)

Postrojba koju je većina veterana iz doba hladnog rata poznavala kao 2. oklopna konjička pukovnija (ACR) nedavno je izbacila oklopno vozilo Stryker i sada je označena kao 2. konjička pukovnija stryker (SCR). Druga konjička pukovnija Stryker vojna je jedinica unutar vojske Sjedinjenih Država koja svoju lozu može pratiti od početka 19. stoljeća. 2SCR ima razliku kao najduža jedinica koja neprekidno služi u vojsci Sjedinjenih Država. Misija 2. Cav -a je, po primitku zapovijedi, brzo rasporediti i izvršiti izvidničke i sigurnosne operacije bilo gdje u svijetu i biti spreman za borbu po dolasku i pobjedu.

2. pukovnija draguna konstituirana je 23. svibnja 1836. za borbu u indijskim kampanjama Seminole na Floridi. Dragoon je u osnovi bio konjanički pješak. Smatralo se da je ta vrsta jedinice najsposobnija u pobjedi okretnog i nedostižnog Seminola. Iz ovih kampanja pukovnija je zaradila svoju prvu bitku. Drugi zmajevi tada su služili na Teksaškoj granici čuvajući zapadnu ekspanziju nacije. Pukovnija se borila u Meksičko-američkom ratu, ranim indijskim ratovima na granici, Krvarećem Kansasu i Mormonskom ratu u Utahu.

Kad je u proljeće 1861. počeo građanski rat, 2. zmajevi su prošli dugačak put Sjedinjenim Državama kako bi se pridružili saveznim snagama oko Washingtona. Elementi jedinice stigli su na vrijeme kako bi sudjelovali u Prvoj bitci za Bull Run. 2. zmajevi, kao i sve montirane postrojbe, reorganizirani su i postali su 2. američka konjica 3. kolovoza 1861. Druga američka konjica služila je u gotovo svim većim bitkama i kampanjama u kojima je sudjelovala Savezna armija Potomac. Pukovnija je zaradila 14 bojnih streamera tijekom građanskog rata i tri druga konjička vojnika nagrađeni su Kongresnom medaljom časti.

Nakon građanskog rata 2. konjaništvo se vratilo na Zapad. Pukovnija je do 1890. sudjelovala u indijskim ratovima. 2. konjička pukovnija bila je raštrkana po granici, gdje su pozvani da čuvaju mir, istražuju ogromne nepoznate zemlje novog teritorija, uspostavljaju utvrde i razvijaju cestovne sustave i telegrafske linije. 2. američka konjička pukovnija dodala je svojim bojama jedanaest dodatnih bojnih pruga iz indijanskih ratova. Još petnaest vojnika 2. konjaništva u tom je razdoblju odlikovano Kongresnom medaljom časti.

1898., tijekom Španjolsko-američkog rata, druga konjica raspoređena je na Kubu, pridružujući se Teddyju Rooseveltu i Grubim jahačima u borbama na El Canayu, brdu San Juan, Aquadoresu i Santiagu. 2. konjička pukovnija boravila je na Kubi na okupacionoj dužnosti do 1903. Od 1903. do 1906. i ponovno od 1910. do 1912. pukovnija je služila na Filipinskim otocima. Tamo su vodili operacije protiv domorodaca Moro i pobunu protiv uspostavljene filipinske vlade. Po povratku s Filipina, druga konjica bila je stacionirana u Fort Blissu u Teksasu radi provođenja granične sigurnosti tijekom burnih godina meksičke revolucije.

Prvi svjetski rat bio je još jedno doba tijekom kojeg se istaknula 2. konjička pukovnija. Do 1917. pukovnija sa sjedištem u Forts Ethan Allan, VT i Fort Myers, VA obučavala je dodatne konjičke postrojbe za nadolazeći rat. Na temelju svoje reputacije i povijesti, general Pershing pozvao je pukovniju da služi u američkim ekspedicijskim snagama (AEF), a 1917. pukovnija je raspoređena u Europu kao jedina američka konjička jedinica na konjima koja se borila u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Pukovnija je služila u američkom sektoru u izvođenju konjičkih operacija i korištena je kao eksploatacijska snaga u nekoliko borbenih operacija, radeći kao Dragoni, silazeći s konja kako bi zadržali ključni teren. Pukovnija je ovim akcijama dokazala da konjičke jedinice na konjskim konjima još uvijek imaju vrijednost na suvremenom bojištu. Druga konjica ostala je s okupacijskom vojskom u Njemačkoj u Koblenzu do kolovoza 1919. godine.

Tijekom međuratnih godina 2. konjička pukovnija bila je stacionirana u Fort Rileyju u Kansasu. Tamo je pukovnija obavljala mirnodopske dužnosti kao pukovnija za obuku konjičkih škola od 1919. do 1939. U Fort Rileyju pukovnija je eksperimentirala s prvim oklopnim automobilima, a 1936., kako je postalo dostupno više novca za manevre, sudjelovao je u prvim oklopnim i konjičkim manevrima .

Kad su 7. prosinca 1941. Sjedinjene Države ušle u Drugi svjetski rat, 2. konjička pukovnija SAD -a bila je duboko uključena u obuku konjaničkih vojnika u mehaniziranim operacijama u Fort Rileyju. U svim postojećim konjičkim pukovnijama izvršene su prilagodbe kako bi se pomoglo stvaranju novih oklopnih jedinica koje su bile potrebne za borbu u Europi. Nakon restrukturiranja, u siječnju 1943. pukovnija je ponovno označena kao 2. konjička skupina (mehanizirana).

Tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata, pukovnija je, pod novom oznakom "2. konjička skupina", 19. srpnja 1944. iskrcala se u Francuskoj, postavši dio Treće armije generala Pattona. U tom je razdoblju pukovnija postala poznata kao "Duhovi Pattonove vojske" zbog svoje sposobnosti provođenja izviđanja, što se naizgled proizvelo po volji iza njemačkih linija. Pukovnija je najdublje prodrla u rat, stigavši ​​u Čehoslovačku prije nego što se konačno povezala sa sovjetskim snagama na zapadu. Pukovnija je također izvela poznati napad iza sovjetskih linija kako bi spasila slavne pastuhe lipicance.

Na kraju rata postrojbe koje su imale lozu Drugog zmaja ponovno su označene kao 2. američka oružnička pukovnija. Njihova je misija bila prvo služiti kao okupacijske snage, zatim kao nadzor i sigurnost uz željeznu zavjesu Istočne Njemačke i Čehoslovačke. Pukovnija je ostala u Njemačkoj sljedećih 47 godina. 2. oružnička pukovnija reorganizirana je i ponovno imenovana 2. oklopno-konjička pukovnija 1948. Druga ACR služila je uz istočnonjemačku i čehoslovačku geopolitičku granicu do kraja hladnog rata, do 1992. U tom razdoblju Dragooni su izlazili novije. oružje, tenkove i opremu dok služe na prednjoj granici slobode.

Kad je Irak napao Kuvajt u kolovozu 1990., 2d ACR bila je potpuno obučena borbena postrojba kombiniranog naoružanja, opremljena tenkovima M1A1 Abrams i borbenim vozilima konjice M-2 Bradley. Dok je mirnodopska misija Pukovnije bila obrana i odvraćanje uz granicu, njihova je ratna misija trebala biti snaga za pokrivanje američkog VII korpusa. U studenom 1990. drugi ACR raspoređen je u Saudijsku Arabiju kao podrška operaciji Pustinjski štit (kasnije Operacija Pustinjska oluja) gdje će predvoditi napad VII korpusa. Dana 26. veljače 1991. pukovnija je bila uvelike uključena u blokiranje iračkog protunapada na Kuvajt od strane sedam republikanskih divizija garde Sadama Huseina. Na pustom mjestu duboko u istočnoj iračkoj pustinji 2. oklopno -konjička pukovnija angažirala je diviziju Tawakalna. Taj je angažman postao poznat kao "Bitka kod 73 Eastinga". Ishod ove bitke bilo je uništenje iračkih oklopnih snaga koje su pukovniji donijele Nagradu za hrabrost vojske. Akcije protiv iračkih divizija postale su poučni primjeri modernog oklopnog rata visokog intenziteta.

Vrativši se iz Zaljeva, pukovnija je premještena iz Njemačke u Fort Lewis, Washington, nakon 49 godina neprekidne prekomorske službe. Kopnene eskadrile Pukovnije pretvorene su u laku konjičku jedinicu koja se sastoji od Humveesa (Scout HMMWV) montiranih s TOW bacačima, bacačima granata MK-19, mitraljezima kalibra .50 i automatskim oružjem (SAW). 2. ACR (Svjetlo) tada je poslano u Ft Polk, LA 1992. 2. oklopna konjička pukovnija (Svjetlo) postala je "konjička korpus" ili oči i uši XVIII zračno -desantnog korpusa. U Fort Polku, 4. eskadrila (eskadrila pukovnijskog zrakoplovstva) dodana je u organizaciju nove pukovnije. Dodavanjem 4/2 ACR (Air Cav), sa svojim izviđačkim helikopterima OH-58D Kiowa Warrior i helikopterima UH-60, dovršena je reorganizacija pukovnije u laku konjičku pukovniju.

Pukovnija je sljedeći put bila raspoređena kao potpora operaciji Uzdržavanje demokracije na Haitiju od 1995. do 1996. 1997. godine, 2. ACR je raspoređen u Bosnu kako bi služio kao dio NATO -ovog SFOR -a za podršku Operaciji Zajednička straža za mirovne operacije u toj zemlji.

Nakon povratka iz Bosne, pukovnija se vratila u utvrdu Polk u Louisiani. Godine 2002. elementi Pukovnije raspoređeni su u jugozapadnu Aziju kao podrška operaciji Trajna sloboda u Afganistanu u sklopu Globalnog rata protiv terorizma. Ubrzo se jedinica ponovo rasporedila u Zaljev, ovaj put za operaciju Iračka sloboda. Sa samo 96 sati obavijesti, pukovnija je rasporedila Drugu eskadrilu i postrojbu O (zračna konjica) za zaštitu komunikacijskih linija V korpusa tijekom velikih borbenih operacija protiv iračke vojske. Do svibnja 2003. cijela je pukovnija bila raspoređena i služila u operacijskom području Bagdada. Nakon ustanka Sadr u travnju 2004. obilazak pukovnije produžen je u borbama. Drugi ACR vodio je urbane bitke u Sadr Cityju, Diwaniyi, Al Kutu, Kufi i An Najafu. Pukovnija je ostala ukupno 16 mjeseci i zaradila je nagradu Predsjedničke jedinice.

U ožujku 2005. drugi ACR preseljen je u Fort Lewis, Washington. U travnju 2005. pukovnija je ponovno imenovana 2. konjička pukovnija i počela se reorganizirati u najnoviji borbeni tim Stryker brigade (SBCT). Pukovnija se vraćala svojoj prvobitnoj misiji kao Dragooni, ili pješaštvo.

Dana 1. lipnja 2006. godine 2. konjička pukovnija i 1. brigada 25. pješačke divizije provele su zajedničku ceremoniju ponovnog označavanja zastave i oblaganja. 2. CR ponovno je označen kao 4. brigada, 2. pješačka divizija (Stryker). Prva brigada, 25. pješačka divizija predstavila je boje svoje brigade i ponovno označena kao 2. konjička pukovnija Stryker (SCR). Od 15. rujna 2006. godine, 2. konjička pukovnija Stryker boravila je kod kuće u vojarni Rose u Vilsecku u Njemačkoj, u blizini hladnoratovske pukovnije u Nürnbergu. S temeljima taktike zasnovane na pješaštvu i pokretljivošću vozila Stryker, brigada Stryker postala je više hibridna jedinica, popunjavajući jaz između čistog lakog pješaštva i mehaniziranog, teškog pješaštva.

3. kolovoza 2007. u Vilsecku je održana oproštajna svečanost dok je 2. SCR bio spreman za ponovno raspoređivanje u Irak u znak podrške operaciji Iračka sloboda. Predviđena im je turneja do 15 mjeseci. Od močvara Floride do pustinja Iraka, drugi zmajevi su ispunili svoj moto "Toujours Pr & ecirct", što znači "Uvijek spremni", kada naša nacija nazove.

Prodavnica darova 2. konjičke pukovnije Stryker:

Kupujte 2. ACR poklon artikle i majice u našoj trgovini & raquo

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Operacije Iraqi Freedom – Resolute Sword – Dragoon Sabre

Kamp Muleskinner, Irak
2. oklopna konjička pukovnija i pridružene postrojbe odlikovale su se u Globalnom ratu protiv terorizma u znak potpore OPERACIJSKOJ IRAČKOJ SLOBODI od 30. ožujka 2003. do ponovnog raspoređivanja 15. srpnja 2004. Pukovnija je imala elemente OPCON u sastavu 3. pješačke divizije i 82. zrakoplovne jedinice. Divizija tijekom velikih borbenih operacija (30. ožujka -"15. svibnja 03") protiv Saddamovog režima i uništenja iračke vojske, a zatim OPCON do 1. oklopne divizije (16. svibnja 2003. -15. srpnja 2004.), istaknuvši se iznimnim herojstvom i galantnost tijekom borbi, operacije stabilnosti i sigurnosti u znak podrške operacijama Iračka sloboda i operaciji Odlučan mač (produženje borbe 90 dana). Bez obzira na misiju ili zadatak, svaka eskadrila i zasebna satnija odigrali su vitalnu ulogu u vraćanju Iraka pod kontrolu iračkog naroda i poboljšanju kvalitete života građana istočnog Bagdada i južnog Iraka. Tijekom raspoređivanja sve dodijeljene i pridružene jedinice izvršavale su svoje misije dok su bile pod stalnom prijetnjom napada gerilskog stila bivših lojalista režima, pobunjenika i stranih terorističkih mreža. Ova priča ističe neka od najvećih postignuća pukovnije, ali se ne može nadati da će odati priznanje svim izuzetnim postignućima vojnika pukovnije. To je jednostavno pregled glavnih događaja koji su pridonijeli uspjehu pukovnije tijekom petnaest mjeseci provedenih u iračkom kazalištu.

Glavne borbene operacije

2. oklopna konjička pukovnija upozorena je 26. ožujka 03. sa zadatkom da pošalje Eskadrilu kopnene konjice (+) u Irak radi osiguranja komunikacijskih linija za V korpus tijekom početne faze operacije Iračka sloboda. 96 sati kasnije pukovnija (2/2 ACR i odmetnička postrojba (OH-58D) iz 4/2 ACR) iskrcala se u jugozapadnoj Aziji. Dana 5. travnja 2003. ti elementi 2. oklopne konjičke pukovnije prešli su granicu Kuvajta i Iraka kako bi izveli ofenzivne operacije protiv Sadamovog režima i iračke vojske. 2d eskadrila i pukovnija TAC na čelu sa 71. pukovnikom pukovnije, COL -om Terryjem Wolffom, premjestili su se kako bi osigurali stražnje područje V korpusa i spriječili gerilske napade snaga Fedayeen Sadama na komunikacijskim linijama kao korpus, predvođen 3. pješaštvom Divizije, krenuo na sjever kako bi uništio iračku vojsku i okončao partijski režim Ba ’ atha pod Saddamom Husseinom. Radeći s elementima 82. zračno -desantne divizije od 6. travnja 2003. do 9. travnja 2003., pukovnija je djelovala u gradu Samawah i okolici kako bi pronašla, popravila i uništila nepravilne snage Fedayeen Sadama koje djeluju u tom području, ograničavajući protok oružja i militantnih snaga koje putuju uz autocestu 9 i ponovno otvoriti zamjensku liniju opskrbe od Kuvajta do Bagdada. Koristeći mješavinu smrtonosnih i nesmrtonosnih požara, operacije kontrolnih točaka, izviđanje zona usmjerenih prema sili i ogromnu vatrenu moć tijekom trodnevnog razdoblja, čisteći i osiguravajući tri glavna gradska područja uz ASR MIAMI (HWY 9) između As Samawaha i An Nadžaf.

Dana 10. travnja 2003., 2d eskadrila preselila se na sjever u An Najaf, uspostavljajući Operativnu bazu za naprijed u napuštenom kampu za obuku Fedayeen u istočnoj polovici grada. Odatle su vodili borbene operacije koje su se protezale gotovo stotinu kilometara u svim smjerovima. Pukovnija je pronašla, zaplijenila i uništila brojne spremljene sustave protuzračne obrane te bezbroj minobacačkih i jurišnih pušaka. Osim toga, pronašli su i izvršili pretres zgrade zgrade sjedišta stranke Ba ’ ath u Diwaniyahu, dajući ogromnu količinu obavještajne dokumentacije, uključujući popise članova cijele stranke Ba ’ ath u Diwaniyahu i okolici. Pukovnija je također tijekom ove kritične faze rata obavljala misije čišćenja ruta i pratnje konvoja duž primarnih i zamjenskih opskrbnih putova južnog Iraka. Nedvosmisleni uspjeh pukovnije u njihovoj misiji, desetodnevna borbena operacija koja se protezala 750 km od Kuvajta do Bagdada, rezultat je njihove hrabrosti, taktičke stručnosti i nepokolebljive predanosti te je osigurao neprekinuti protok kritično potrebnih zaliha do glavne jedinice V korpusa naporima u Bagdadu i omogućio slobodu kretanja 4. pješačkoj diviziji, 3. ACR-u i drugim pratećim postrojbama za prolazak do sjevernog i zapadnog Iraka i dovršavanje uništenja režima Sadama Husseina. Za svoje herojske napore, pukovnija TAC, 2. eskadrila i pridruženi Dragoni nagrađeni su citatom predsjedničke jedinice kao podređeni element 3. pješačke divizije.

Područje djelovanja u Bagdadu

17. travnja 2003. -„1. travnja 2004

Područje djelovanja pukovnije (AO) od 3. travnja-„04. travnja bila je istočna strana Bagdada, sa populacijom od 3-4 milijuna ljudi, pretežno šiitskih#8217 a s relativno velikim kršćanskim sektorom, međusobno miješanih sunita stanovništva i palestinski izbjeglički kamp. Ovaj AO uključivao je pretežno Shi ’ kvart od 9 Nissijana i Shi ’ sirotinjski četvrt Sadr City (bivši Saddam City). Grad Sadr bio je glavni napor pukovnije u ovoj fazi. Tijekom ove faze operacije, 2-37 AR iz sastava 1AD priključeno je pukovniji, a 3. eskadrila je odvojena od 2. BCT/1AD gdje je izvršavala sigurnosne misije konvoja za privremenu koalicijsku vlast u Iraku.

MISIJA: 2ACR provodi operacije čitavog spektra kako bi uspostavio red u području operacija u Bagdadu kako bi omogućio uspostavu samodostatne, reprezentativne vlade u Iraku. Po narudžbi, prenesite odgovornost na odgovarajuće civilno ili vojno tijelo, što će pukovniji omogućiti ponovni raspored.

Dnevne operacije u Bagdadu:

-¢ Izvidničke patrole i napadne operacije usmjerene na lojaliste bivšeg režima, strane teroriste i vjerske vođe koji se aktivno protive naporima Koalicije

-security Fiksna sigurnost mjesta usmjerena na kritičnu infrastrukturu, policijske postaje i bolnice

-¢ Pomoć pri popravljanju infrastrukture radi poboljšanja iračke kvalitete života

-¢ Podržavanje stvaranja iračkih institucija radi jačanja sigurnog i zaštićenog okruženja

-Podržavanje stvaranja lokalne uprave

-700 Približno 700 vojnika dnevno provodi 100 ophodnji na konju i s konja

-conducted 3-5 zračnih izviđačkih patrola koje se provode pokrivajući 12-15 sati dnevno usredotočene duž glavnih ruta, fiksnih lokacija i javnih radova

-Force Snage brzog reagiranja na tlu veličine voda (QRF) na svakom FOB-u

-¢ 1 tim izviđačkog oružja (SWT = 2xOH-58D izviđački helo) i 1 UH-60 QRF dostupan 24 sata dnevno

-Unovačena i obučena iračka laka pješačka brigada

Operacija Dragoon Sablja: An Nadžaf, Kufa, Ad-Diwaniyah, Al-Kut

SITUACIJA u travnju 2004 .: 2ACR je završio svoju 12-mjesečnu turneju po Iraku i provodio je završnu fazu borbene primopredaje svog područja djelovanja u Bagdadu 1. pne. BCT, 1. konjička divizija postavljena za 10. travnja 2004. Druga eskadrila je ponovno -raspoređen u Fort Polk 1. travnja, a napredne stranke pukovnije preselile su se u Kuvajt kako bi započele lučke aktivnosti. Cijela zračna snaga Pukovnije u četvrtoj eskadrili odletjela je u Kuvajt kako bi započela utovar na brodove radi ponovnog raspoređivanja. Ostatak pukovnije pripremao se za marš prema jugu do Kuvajta radi ponovnog raspoređivanja.

Početkom 4. travnja 2004., milicija Muhtada Al-Sadr i Mahdi učestvovala je u velikoj demonstraciji u sjedištu privremene vlasti Koalicije u An Najafu, južno od Bagdada. Dva dana kasnije stotine Al-Sadrovih pristaša napale su i zauzele ključne lokacije u An Nadžafu, Ad-Diwaniyahu i Al-Kutu dajući im u suštini kontrolu nad južnim središnjim Irakom. U danima koji slijede 3. eskadrila 2ACR-a, OPCON je do 2BCT/1AD sudjelovao u napadu na miliciju u Al-Kutu kako bi svladao tamošnje uporište milicije. Sadrov ustanak u travnju 2004. bio je na punoj snazi, promjena u
Operativna situacija koja se nije očekivala. 1. oklopna divizija i 2. ACR produžile bi se na 90 dana u borbi kako bi se ugušio ovaj ustanak i pobijedila Sadrova ilegalna milicija.

Operacija Dragoon Sabre započela je prvog tjedna u travnju, a glavno tijelo pukovnije rasteretilo je 2BCT kako bi preuzelo kontrolu nad Al-Kutom. Pukovnija je tada dobila zadatak rasteretiti elemente 1ID -a koji su bili postavljeni u blizini An Najafa nakon što se u tom gradu dogodila ofenziva milicije. 1. eskadrila ostala je u Al-Kutu zajedno s eskadrilom za pukovniju potporu. Četvrta eskadrila premještena iz Kuvajta u Al-Kut kako bi započela izvođenje zračne potpore iz prednje operativne baze. Dana 20. travnja 2004. 2d oklopna konjička pukovnija, s pridruženom 2d bojni, 37. oklopnom jedinicom 1. oklopne divizije, preuzela je misiju iz 3. brigade, 1. pješačke divizije, u Svetom gradu An Najaf, Irak. Treća eskadrila se u to vrijeme vratila pod kontrolu pukovnije. Neprijatelj, poznat kao milicija Muqtada, kontrolirao je An Nadžaf i susjednu Al Kufu. Izjava o misiji: uništiti miliciju i uspostaviti red u An Najafu i Al Kufi kako bi se omogućio prijelaz ovlaštenja na legitimnu iračku vladu i, prema nalogu, prenijele sigurnosne odgovornosti na iračke sigurnosne snage. 2d ACR i priključci borili su se neprestano šest tjedana i slomili neprijateljsku volju za borbu. Uništili su više od 600 milicija i ranili bezbroj drugih, zarobili i uništili oružje, uspješno zadržali dva glavna pomoćnika Muqtade al Sadra i zaplijenili skladišta oružja na svetom groblju i džamiji Sahla, što je na kraju dovelo do poraza Sadrove milicije u Nadžaf i Kufa.


Danas u povijesti: 'Operacija Iračka sloboda' počinje

AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

19. ožujka 2003 .: Koalicija predvođena SAD-om napala je Irak. Predsjednik Bush rekao je da je cilj operacije Iračka sloboda "razoružavanje Iraka, oslobađanje njegovih ljudi i obrana svijeta od ozbiljne opasnosti". Iračku invaziju snažno je podržao potpredsjednik Cheney. Kao ministar obrane tijekom Zaljevskog rata 1991., protivio se invaziji na Irak, rekavši da nije vrijedno žrtava ili "zatrpati se". U ratu u Iraku poginulo je 4.486 Amerikanaca, a još 32.223 je ranjeno. Izravna potrošnja na rat u Iraku procjenjuje se na 757 milijardi dolara, brojka koja ne uključuje kamate na novac posuđen za financiranje rata - ili brigu o veteranima. Studija Sveučilišta Brown iz 2011. godine kaže da bi također moglo stajati 1 bilijun dolara više (do 2050.) za brigu o veteranima 105-mjesečnog rata.

19. ožujka 2011 .: Predsjednik Obama naredio je zračne napade na Libiju, u sklopu odluke Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a o nametanju zone zabranjenog leta. Rekao je Kongresu da su napadi poduzeti s francuskim, britanskim i drugim saveznicima, da će biti ograničeni opsegom i trajanjem te da je sprječavanje humanitarne katastrofe u Libiji u najboljem interesu američke vanjske politike i ciljeva nacionalne sigurnosti.

Citat dana

"Prava povijest moje uprave bit će napisana za 50 godina, a ti i ja to nećemo vidjeti." -George W. Bush


POVIJEST Trezor: Operacija Pustinjska oluja

Iako je dugogodišnji rat između Irana i Iraka završio u prekidu vatre posredstvom Ujedinjenih naroda u kolovozu 1988., do sredine 1990. dvije države još nisu počele pregovarati o trajnom mirovnom sporazumu. Kad su se njihovi ministri vanjskih poslova tog srpnja sastali u Ženevi, izgledali su sjajni izgledi za mir. Dva tjedna kasnije, međutim, Saddam Hussein održao je govor u kojem je optužio susjedni Kuvajt za istjecanje sirove nafte sa njihove zajedničke granice, tvrdeći da su se Kuvajt i Saudijska Arabija urotili kako bi zadržali niske cijene nafte u nastojanju da se ustupe zapadnim zemljama koje kupuju naftu .

Osim zapaljivog govora Huseina, Irak je počeo gomilati trupe na granici s Kuvajtom. Uznemiren tim postupcima, egipatski predsjednik Hosni Mubarak pokrenuo je pregovore između Iraka i Kuvajta, ali je Husein prekinuo pregovore nakon samo dva sata, te je 2. kolovoza 1990. naredio invaziju na Kuvajt. Huseinova pretpostavka da će njegove arapske države stati uz njega pokazala se pogrešnom procjenom. Uznemireni tim postupcima, dvije trećine od 21 članice Arapske lige osudilo je čin agresije Iraka, a kralj Saudijske Arabije Fahd, zajedno s kuvajtskom vladom u egzilu, okrenuo se Sjedinjenim Državama i drugim državama. članice Sjevernoatlantskog saveza (NATO) za podršku.


Neuspjeh operacije Iračka sloboda

Ono oko čega se svi mogu složiti u vezi s trenutnom krizom u Iraku jest da je Operacija Iračka sloboda, slogan koji je Pentagon koristio uoči invazije na Irak 2003. godine, bio jedan veliki veliki bijedni neuspjeh. Unatoč planovima Pentagona i CIA-e da pretvore Irak u raj slobode masovnom smrću i uništavanjem bombi, projektila, tenkova i oružja, ova je zemlja danas jedna ogromna paklena rupa nasilja i odsutnosti slobode.

Zapravo, ubojstvo Pentagona iranskog general -majora Qassima Suleimanija savršeni je znak neuspjeha operacije Iračka sloboda. Sulejmanijevo prisustvo u Iraku označavalo je lakoću kojom iranski dužnosnici, i vojni i nevojni, posjećuju Bagdad i lako putuju po gradu, što mora razbjesniti Pentagon i CIA-u. Nasuprot tome, američki dužnosnici znaju da će, ako to pokušaju učiniti, njihovi životi brzo biti ugašeni u zemlji operacije "Iračka sloboda".

To što svaki Amerikanac nakon ovog fijaska i dalje može biti intervencionist nije mi jasno. Operacija Iračka sloboda trebala je biti kampanja Pentagona i CIA -e da američkom narodu pokažu "uslugu" koju mogu pružiti iako je Hladni rat završio. Mogli su upasti u zemlje Trećeg svijeta i donijeti im slobodu silom oružja. Operacija Sloboda Iraka trebala je biti njihov izlog.

Ne zaboravimo, na kraju krajeva, da je iračka invazija bila običan stari agresivni rat, vrsta rata koja je osuđena kao ratni zločin u Nürnbergu. Američka vlada napala je i izvršila invaziju na zemlju koja nikada nije napala Sjedinjene Države niti je čak prijetila da će to učiniti. Samoobrana se bavila Irakom, a ne američkom vladom.

Ratni zločin komplicirala je i činjenica da je Irak bio zemlja Trećeg svijeta, osiromašena više od desetljeća brutalnih sankcija SAD -a i UN -a. Ishod rata nikada nije bio sumnjiv, s obzirom na to da je najmoćniji režim u povijesti napadao i napadao jedan od najslabijih režima na svijetu.

Ne zaboravimo da je promjena režima bila cilj brutalnih sankcija SAD-a i UN-a nekih 11 godina prije invazije na Irak nakon 11. septembra, ispunjene strahom. Tijekom tih 11 godina sankcija, američki dužnosnici jasno su dali do znanja iračkom diktatoru Saddamu Husseinu, koji je nekoć bio blizak prijatelj i saveznik američkog nacionalnog sigurnosnog establišmenta, da će, ako napusti zemlju, sankcije koji bi ubili stotine tisuća iračke djece, bili bi ukinuti. Američki dužnosnici nadali su se da će Saddam otići kako bi mogli jeftino uspostaviti svoj raj slobode - to jest, bez potrebe za smrću i uništenjem invazijom i okupacijom.

Vrijedi napomenuti da u sklopu operacije Iračka sloboda nikada nije postojala gornja granica broja Iračana koji su mogli biti ubijeni i osakaćeni u nastojanju da Irak pretvore u raj slobode. Bilo koji broj Iračana ubijenih i osakaćenih smatralo bi se "vrijednim toga", iako očito mrtvi ne bi bili u blizini da uživaju u toj "slobodi".


Opet zaboravljajući protu pobunu: lekcije iz obnove i operacije Iračka sloboda

Pentagon je uključen u stratešku transformaciju koja bi mogla ugroziti budućnost američke nacionalne sigurnosti. Prema neovisnom dvostranačkom povjerenstvu koje je imenovao Kongres 2018., zaokupljenost Sjedinjenih Država protu pobunom (COIN) i protuterorizmom omogućila je bliskim kolegama i odmetnutim državama da smanje jaz u sposobnostima između svojih vojski i jedine svjetske velesile. Kreatori politike i obrambena zajednica moraju priznati da natjecanje velikih sila nije samo test konvencionalne vojne snage, već zahtijeva i ovladavanje akcijama ispod praga velikog rata koje uključuju protu pobunu, neregularno ratovanje, hibridne prijetnje, operacije stabilnosti i zona." Sposobnost COIN -a ključna je za američko natjecanje i sukobe s drugim državama te rat s nedržavnim akterima. Američka vojska treba biti oprezna da ne posveti previše resursa ratu visokog intenziteta. Ovaj članak istražuje promijenjeni pristup službe prema pripravnosti i krajolik prijetnji. It then compares the transition from official hostilities to stability operations early in post–Civil War Reconstruction (1865–1866) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2004) to demonstrate that counterinsurgency requires a heavy commitment to manpower and training.

The Army has not completely abandoned COIN. It retains the capability through doctrine, education, and assistance it provides to other armed forces. 2018 godina Army Strategy and 2019 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations affirm that irregular warfare is important—a view echoed by Pentagon officials and an officer self-study webpage. A 2019 article in War Room, the online journal of the Army War College, actually criticizes the counterinsurgency emphasis of the training.

The general trend, however, has been a course correction. Congress and the defense community doubt American readiness for a major conflict. In January 2017, for example, the Army reported only three of fifty-eight brigade combat teams ready for immediate deployment. The result is a growing emphasis on the dangers that China and Russia pose. 2018 godina National Defense Strategy declares that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” More evidence of this shift can be found in the 2018 National Military Strategy, the 2019 Army Modernization Strategy, and the Pentagon purchase of new vehicles and weapon systems. Articles in Vojni pregled, Dnevnik malih ratova, i War on the Rocks note the Army pivot to conventional warfare. The approval of some senior officers and the decreased size of the service facilitate this trend, as does limited funding that adds pressure to prioritize the greatest threats. Given the Army’s renewed emphasis on major war, its response to insurgencies will depend on security force assistance brigades and special operations forces. Its stability operations will involve small deployments, reliance on partners, and prioritizing aid to civilian agencies.

The Army risks forgetting past experience. Comparable doctrines emerged from Vietnam and Iraq, reflecting the Army’s tendency to avoid preparing for occupations, grudgingly adapt to them, and discard the knowledge afterward. Illustrative of growing disinterest in counterinsurgency are generals who regard irregular tasks as a lesser aspect of conventional duties. The Army’s history with irregular operations reveals that COIN requires more resources, but as Capt. Justin Lynch warns, the Pentagon may “acknowledge the importance of counterinsurgency, but not provide enough training or resources to produce an effective force.”

The Department of Defense formally defines COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.” This article uses it more generally to denote Army activities that promote stability and defeat insurgents. They range from kinetic operations, to enforcing law and order, to winning hearts and minds. These capabilities must remain an Army priority. Navigating the transition from conflict to a condition of stable governance is central to modern warfare. Maintaining a counterinsurgency capability is essential for this mission and reflects the fact that the defense community cannot remove this option from the ones available to policymakers. Concentrating exclusively on conventional fighting implies that America can choose its conflicts, an assumption disproven by history. Irregular operations have imposed a heavy toll in casualties, money spent, and reputation lost. Roughly four-fifths of global conflicts since 1815 have been either civil wars or insurgencies there were 181 of the latter from the Second World War to 2015. Between 1798 and 2018, nearly three-quarters of American operations abroad were irregular, while one-fourth were conventional. Being unable to wage such campaigns reduces the service’s deterrent effect and American influence in unstable, strategic regions.

Critics of this view might argue that many of these counterinsurgencies were wars of choice as opposed to wars of necessity. The problem with this thinking is that states choose to wage war in order to advance their interests. A conflict may appear unnecessary in hindsight, but policymakers at the time regarded it as a national imperative. As military historian Sir Michael Howard wrote, the primary motivation for warfare over the past two centuries has been the ability of humans to “discern, or believe that they can discern, dangers before they become immediate.” Focusing solely on unavoidable wars deprives the Army of capabilities, giving the initiative to hostile actors and thus weakening American foreign policy. The service will struggle to shape the threat environment if it is unable to intervene short of large-scale combat operations.

The ability to win a high-intensity conflict does not produce victory in a counterinsurgency, which frequently involves unique challenges. Army preparations must account for the fact that it will operate among civilians, and that rivals will combine regular and irregular warfare. Moreover, they will support insurgencies to avoid confronting America’s conventional overmatch. China, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia have either fostered such conflicts or can do so. Nonstate actors, with improved access to information and technology, form globally connected insurgencies that elude defeat by moving from one country to another. Articles in Vanjska politika, Vojni pregled, Dnevnik malih ratova, i War on the Rocks affirm the relevance of COIN insurgencies will be strategically important to great-power competition.

A comparison of Reconstruction and Operation Iraqi Freedom informs Army planning by revealing that ample manpower and consistent conduct are critical to success . The service will not have enough appropriately trained officers and soldiers if it sidelines counterinsurgency in favor of conventional war.

Troop Numbers

The Army during Reconstruction formed “a patchwork of sovereignties” across the South due to limited manpower. There were approximately one million Federals in uniform as of April 1865, the month the Civil War ended, but that number would drop quickly and dramatically. The number of troops overseeing Reconstruction shrank from about 190,000 in September of that year to roughly twenty-five thousand by December 1866. Available data indicates that this was a demanding assignment. In 1867, for example, the service numbered fifty-seven thousand, and over two-fifths of its companies were stationed in the South in the winter of 1867–1868. The Army force level for Reconstruction was too small for two reasons. First, it was attempting to control a population of nine million people in a territory that equaled the combined size of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Second, it ruled by martial law for most of this period, functioning as “a relief agency, a police force, a court, a public works bureau, and a school system.” The service’s constrained military means were a poor fit for its sweeping political powers. Stability crumbled with troop reductions, and resistance developed in areas devoid of Federals. Whereas soldiers once deterred violence by occupying county seats and towns located at major crossroads, shrinking numbers forced them to cede many rural areas to planters, and left civilians vulnerable to criminals. Many Southern whites engaged in terrorism that targeted the economic and political activity of freedpeople and loyal whites. They burned churches attacked, sued, and killed soldiers intimidated and assaulted loyal whites to expel them seized the property of former slaves and unleashed violence on them, resulting in hundreds of murders. By the end of 1866, much of the South collapsed into “near-statelessness.”

A century and a half later, the issue of insufficient troops likewise hindered the Army from quashing the insurgencies in Iraq, a country larger than California with a population of twenty-five million people. Force levels dropped from nearly 153,000 at the close of fiscal year 2003 to around 102,000 in September 2004.The Army numbered just under five hundred thousand in total between 2003 and 2004 hence, Operation Iraqi Freedom imposed a heavy burden by absorbing between 20 and just over 30 percent of the service’s available manpower. Soldier density varied widely, which frustrated efforts to defeat the enemy as well as to secure the borders, perform constabulary duties, seize weapons caches, handle detainees, and train Iraqi soldiers. There were shortfalls of interrogators, military police, Arabic linguists, interpreters, military intelligence assets, construction units, civil affairs personnel, and engineers. The dearth of combatants limited face-to-face interactions with Iraqis and helped drive some units to act on emotion rather than conducting the careful efforts required to build popular support and minimize collateral damage. Perhaps most importantly, there was usually no operational reserve in theater. It was impossible to balance troop distribution between the center of Iraq and its border areas, which enabled the insurgencies to grow. Units occupied areas until enemy activity faded and then moved on, which allowed the latter to retake those locations. Filling gaps, moreover, required pulling forces from elsewhere, so there were too few soldiers in key zones. Small units lost control of some hostile areas, other communities without large bodies of troops witnessed a decline in Iraqi security capability and greater Sunni-Shia tensions, and towns fell to insurgents due to inadequate protection. In at least one instance, it proved necessary to draw on a corps reserve that could not be reformed for lack of manpower.

Ground-Level Practice

The Army’s ground-level conduct was uneven during Reconstruction, an issue for which officers were largely responsible. Some suspended civil courts yet did not establish military ones for several months. They had flexibility in writing their own rules for legal appeals, and in creating provost courts that at times dealt with the cases of freedpeople. There were disagreements within the Army about the meaning of freedom for former slaves while officers favored written labor contracts for them, another idea was for them to buy land over time. Support for the creation of area militias was not universal. Lenient officers allowed local authorities to remain in office, worked so that ex-Confederates could serve in that capacity, promoted elections, established police companies, and distributed instructions to facilitate interaction between ex-slaves and their prior owners. Other examples of this behavior included the offering of transport for ex-Confederate soldiers, loaning of draft horses to impoverished farmers, providing shelter and food to white and black refugees, and establishing an affairs bureau for former slaves. Heavy-handed officers repressed newspapers, forbid the continued service of ex-Confederates in local offices, chose new authorities, suspended biased laws, determined election outcomes, and ordered militias to obey Army commands. They even tested civilian loyalty, arrested the unpatriotic, and forbid the public’s use of the word “Confederate.”

The Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom also had an inconsistent approach to counterinsurgency. Some units focused on destroying the enemy by adopting relaxed rules of engagement and performed nighttime cordon-and-search operations that detained large numbers of suspects. Other outfits, however, emphasized nation building. This conciliatory approach involved improved interaction with locals and concentrated on safety, employment, economic recovery, essential services, and governance. It featured more precise operations, less obtrusive cordon-and-search operations, a greater reliance on civil affairs teams, and the fielding, sustaining, and use of new Iraqi army and police units as well as Iraqi Civil Defense Corps outfits. Further inconsistencies occurred in the use of artillery. Approaches ranged from counterbattery fire to the combination of counterfire, intelligence collection, and encouraging locals to ensure enemy forces did not take up position on their land.

The True Cost of COIN

The examples of Reconstruction and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate that counterinsurgency imposes a heavy burden in terms of force levels and preparation. Special operations forces and security force assistance brigades are too few in number to occupy an extensive territory akin to the American South or the smaller yet more populous Iraq. Restricting COIN capability to situations in which the Army supports a host government—rather than leading the effort—ignores fragile states that struggle to ensure effective rule and their citizens’ safety. A large-scale conflict would leave such countries in disarray, necessitating massive counterinsurgency operations.

This raises the question: How should the service commit most of its funding, time, and resources? The answer depends on the assessment of future threats. High-intensity conflict with China or Russia is the most dangerous outcome, since defeat in the worst case might imperil the American homeland. And yet, this observation could be made of any substantial military rival that the United States faces, past or present. In a more probable scenario, those countries would wage wars so costly that America would allow them freedom of action in their areas of influence. The most likely situation, however, is the recurrence of insurgencies, since they have been more common historically than conventional wars. The Army should prepare for future conflict based on this reality rather than falling into the cyclical trap of retreating intellectually from its most recent COIN experience.

America has an expensive track record with counterinsurgency, suggesting a weakness that China and Russia could exploit. The post-9/11 conflicts—in Afghanistan and Iraq—cost the United States about $1.5 trillion as of 2015. This is slightly more than its financial burden in the First World War and the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf wars combined. It may appear that the country can afford such conflicts for years to come, as defense spending only represented 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product in 2018. And yet, the staggering reality of a $984 billion national deficit and $22 trillion national debt in 2019 will surely temper excessive military expenditures. Likewise, the current coronavirus pandemic presents the risk of a major economic downturn that could curb defense spending. The financial cost of COIN is a reminder that a failure to prepare forces the Army into the expensive and time-consuming process of adapting on the fly. Long conflicts are expensive ones, and shortening future counterinsurgencies will only be possible if the service has a well-honed capability.

Assessing near-peer threats requires thinking outside the conventional warfare box. Why would China and Russia risk conventional conflict with America when they could foment insurgencies or perpetuate existing ones in places of strategic significance? The Soviet Union and the United States did so in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively, to weaken one another during the Cold War. Now, the leaders of China and Russia enjoy the advantage of being able to craft a long-term strategy, one that could depend on the attritional effect of counterinsurgency campaigns to reduce the military strength of the United States. Chinese president Xi Jinping can rule indefinitely and Russian president Vladimir Putin is working to do so. Americans elect a new president every four years, however, which can complicate the efforts of US policymakers to craft an enduring strategy.

The Army must balance the national security issue of the moment and the areas that will be most important over the coming years. It should hone its COIN capacity as part of a comprehensive effort to ensure readiness for missions below the major-war threshold. Failing to do so makes counterinsurgency an American vulnerability that near peers will exploit for asymmetric advantage. Restricting Army readiness to conventional war limits the military options available to policymakers, increasing the risk of escalation with a belligerent adversary. The service needs to be prepared for everything from conventional war to COIN, irregular warfare, hybrid threats, stability operations, and the “gray zone.” The ability to engage America’s enemies across the full spectrum of warfare is the only way that the Army can rightfully claim to be the premier land-fighting force in the world. As a superpower, the United States has global commitments. It must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat a broad array of adversaries with wide-ranging means of aggression. A strong counterinsurgency capability will be essential.

Alexandre F. Caillot is a PhD Candidate at Temple University specializing in American military history. His dissertation examines the Civil War, namely the combat performance of Union soldiers who entered the Army of the Potomac in time to serve during the Overland Campaign. He is a Junior Fellow, Program on National Security, at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The author would like to thank the following individuals for unofficial conversations that do not represent the official views of the US Army: Dr. Conrad C. Crane Brig. Gen. (ret) Duke DeLuca Col. (ret) Paul C. Jussel, PhD Dr. Christian B. Keller Col. Jon Klug Maj. Mark Morrison Col. Matthew D. Morton Col. Dave Raugh and Col. (ret) Frank Sobchak. The author would also like to thank Dr. Michael Noonan for offering statistical information from a forthcoming publication on the number of US irregular and conventional operations abroad between 1798 and 2018.


2003 invasion of Iraq

The start of hostilities came after the expiration of a 48-hour deadline which was set by U.S. President George W. Bush, demanding that Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, ending the diplomatic Iraq disarmament crisis.

The US military operations in this war were conducted under the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The UK military operations in this war were conducted under the name of Operation Telic. The Australian codename was Operation Falconer.

The United States, with support from approximately 45,000 British, 2,000 Australian and 200 Polish combat forces, entered Iraq primarily through their staging area in Kuwait. Coalition forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000. Included in these forces were groups of Australian SAS and Commando Personnel who performed Recon and combat search and rescue mission along side American and British SF units.

Timeline of the invasion

The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time. Securing the oil infrastructure was considered important in order to prevent Saddam Hussein's forces from destroying it (as happened in 1991, creating environmental and economic problems).

Casualties of the invading forces were limited, while Iraqi military and civilian casualties are unknown, probably at least in the thousands. A study from the Project on Defense Alternatives ( http://www.comw.org/pda/ ), a Boston-based think tank, numbered the Iraqi casualities between 11,000 and 15,000 ( http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0310rm8.pdf ), and the Iraq Body Count project numbered the civilian Iraqis injured in 20,000 (http://www.iraqbodycount.net/editorial_aug0703.htm). However, the Iraq Body Count projects numbers have been the subject of much debate, and may or may not be overly pessimistic.

The U.S Third Division moved westward and then northward through the desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and a UK expeditionary force moved northward through marshland. UK forces secured Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, following two weeks of conflict, although their control of the city was limited. Preexisting electrical and water shortages continued through the conflict and looting began as Iraqi forces collapsed. While British forces began working with local Iraqi Police to enforce order, humanitarian aid began to arrive from ships landing in the port city of Umm Qasr and trucks entering the country through Kuwait.

Three weeks into the invasion U.S. forces moved into Baghdad with limited resistance, Iraqi government officials either disappeared or conceded defeat. Looting took place in the days following. It was alleged that many items in the National Museum of Iraq were amongst looted items. The F.B.I was soon called into Iraq to track down the stolen items. It was found that the initial claims of looting of substantial portions of the collection were somewhat exaggerated and for months people have been returning objects to the museum. Yet, as some of the dust has settled, thousands of antiquities are still missing including dozens from the main collection.

There has been speculation that some objects still missing were not taken by looters after the war, but were taken by Saddam Hussein or his entourage before or during the fighting. There have also been reports that early looters had keys to vaults that held rarer pieces, and some have speculated as to the systematic removal of key artifacts.

Many in the arts and antiquities communities warned policymakers in advance of the need to secure Iriaqi museums. Despite the looting being somewhat less bad than initially feared, the cultural loss of items from ancient Sumeria is significant. The idea that US forces did not guard the museum because they were guarding the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Interior is apparently true. According to U.S. officials the "reality of the situation on the ground" was that hospitals, water plants, and ministries with vital intelligence needed security more than other sites. There were only enough US troops on the ground to guard a certain number of the many sites that ideally needed protection, and so some "hard choices" were made.

In the north Kurdish forces under the command of U.S. Special Forces captured oil-rich Kirkuk on April 10. On April 15, U.S. forces mostly took control of Tikrit.

As areas were secured, coalition troops began searching for the key members of Saddam Hussein's regime. These individuals were identified by a variety of means, most famously through sets of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards.

On May 1, 2003 George W. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, in a Lockheed S-3 Viking, where he gave a speech announcing end of major combat in the Iraq war. Clearly visible in the background was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished". Bush's landing was criticized by opponents as overly theatrical and expensive. The banner, made by White House personnel (according to a CNN story: http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/) and placed there by the U.S. Navy, was criticized as premature - especially later as the guerrilla war dragged on.

It was soon found that "major combat" being over did not mean that peace had returned to Iraq. The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq thereupon commenced, marked by ongoing violent conflict between the Iraqi and the occupying forces. As of January 2, 2004, the total deaths of American soldiers in the Iraq war since March have reached 483. Of these the majority has been killed after the end of major hostilities on May 1. There is concern being voiced from domestic quarters comparing the situation to previous wars such as the Vietnam War.

The ongoing resistance in Iraq is concentrated in, but not limited to, an area known as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad [1]. Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions. This resistance may be described as guerilla warfare. The tactics used thus far include mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as purported sabotage against the oil infrastructure. There are also accusations about attacks toward the power and water infrastructure, but these are rather questionable in nature. In the only widely covered example of what some considered an attack on the power system, two US soldiers were killed, indicating that they may instead have been the target. In the purported attack against a water main, some witnesses reported seeing an explosion on the pipe, but US soldiers and repair crews on the scene stated that it did not appear to have been caused by an explosion.

There is evidence that some of the resistance is organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Baath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis simply angered over the occupation, and foreign fighters. [1]

Events leading to the invasion

In September 2000, in the Rebuilding America's Defenses report [1], the Project for the New American Century planned an attack on Iraq, independently of whether or not Saddam Hussein remained in power. One year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is reported to have written in his notes, "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]". Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of preemptive military action dubbed the Bush doctrine. In 2002 the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. In October 2002, the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. The Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq was worded so as to encourage, but not require, UN Security Council approval for military action. In November 2002, United Nations actions regarding Iraq culminated in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the resumption of weapons inspections. The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations and military preparations.

Payoff of Iraqi Military

Shortly after the sudden collapse of the defense of Baghdad, rumors were circulating in Iraq and elsewhere that there had been a deal struck (a "safqua") wherein the US had bribed key members of the Iraqi military elite and/or the Baath party itself to stand down. These rumors were generally ignored or treated dismissively in the US media and among the US public.

In late May, 2003, General Tommy Franks announced his retirement. Shortly thereafter, he confirmed in an interview with Defense Week that the US had paid Iraqi military leaders to defect. The extent of the defections and their effect on the war were not clear as of this writing (May 24, 2003).

Invasion justification and goals

The stated justification for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, links with terrorist organizations and human rights violations in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government. To that end, the stated goals of the invasion, according to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were: to end the Saddam Hussein government and help Iraq transition to representative self-rule to find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and terrorists to collect intelligence on networks of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists to end sanctions and to deliver humanitarian support and to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources.

No weapons of mass destruction have been reported as found as of September 21, 2003, though Saddam Hussein's government collapsed, former Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas was captured, and the oil fields and resources were rapidly secured but have since suffered continued sabotage.

After the fall of Baghdad, U.S. officials claimed that Iraqi officials were being harbored in Syria, and several high-ranking Iraqis have since been detained after being expelled from Syria.

Failed peace initiatives

After the war, evidence began to emerge as to the failed attempts to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution.

In December 2002, a representative of the head of Iraqi Intelligence, Gen. Tahir Jalil Habbush al Takriti, contacted former CIA counterterrorism head Vincent Cannistraro, stating that Saddam "knew there was a campaign to September 11 and prove he had weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqis were prepared to satisfy these concerns. I reported the conversation to senior levels of the state department and I was told to stand aside and they would handle it." Cannistrano stated that the offers made were all "killed" by the Bush administration, citing that the fact that they all had Saddam Hussein remain in power was unacceptable.

Shortly after, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's national security advisor, Osama al Baz, sent a message to the U.S. State Department that the Iraqis wanted to discuss the accusations that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and ties with al-Qaeda. Iraq also attempted to reach the US through the Syrian, French, German, and Russian intelligence services. Nothing came of the attempts.

In January 2003, Lebanese-American Imad al-Hage met with Michael Maloof of the DoD's Office of Special Plans. Hage, a resident of Beiruit, had been recruited by the department to assist in the War on Terrorism. He reported that Mohammed Nassif, a close aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, had expressed frustrations about the difficulties of Syria contacting the United States, and had attempted to use him as an intermediary. Maloof arranged for Hage to meet with Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board.

In February 2003, Hage met with the chief of Iraqi intelligence's foreign operations, Hassan al-Obeidi. Obeidi told Hage that Baghdad didn't understand why they were being targetted, and that they had no WMDs he then made the offer for Washington to send in 2000 FBI agents to ascertain this. He additionally offered oil concessions, but stopped short of having Hussein give up power, instead suggesting that elections could be held in two years. Later, Obeidi suggested that Hage travel to Baghdad for talks he accepted.

Later that month, Hage met with Gen. Habbush in addition to Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. He was offered top priority to US firms in oil and mining rights, UN-supervised elections, US inspections (with up to 5,000 inspectors), to have al-Qaeda agent Abdul Rahman Yassin (in Iraqi custody since 1994) handed over as a sign of good faith, and to give "full support for any US plan" in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They also wished to meet with high-ranking US officials. On Feb. 19th, Hage faxed Maloof his report of the trip. Maloof reports having brought the proposal to Jamie Duman. The Pentagon denies that either Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld, Duman's bosses, were aware of the plan.

On February 21st, Maloof informed Duman in an email that Perle wished to meet with Hage and the Iraqis if the Pentagon would clear it. Duman responded "Mike, working this. Keep this close hold.". On March 7th, Perle met with Hage in Knightsbridge, and stated that he wanted to pursue the matter further with people in Washington (both have acknowleged the meeting). A few days later, he informed Hage that Washington refused to let him meet with Habbush to discuss the offer (Hage stated that Perle's response was "that the concensus in Washington was it was a no-go"). Perle told the Times, "The message was 'Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad."

Throughout March, Hage continued to pass messages from Iraqi officials to Maloof. At one point, Maloof wrote a memo stating "Hage quoted Obeidi as saying this is the last window or channel through which this message has gone to the United States. He characterized the tone of Dr. Obeidi as begging." Maloof contacted Perle, stating that Iraqi officials are "prepared to meet with you in Beiruit, and as soon as possible, concerning 'unconditional terms' ", and that "Such a meeting has Saddam Hussein's clearance." No action is taken.

According to an arab source of the Guardian's, Perle sent a Saudi official the following terms for Iraq to fulfill to prevent war: "Saddam's abdication and departure, first to a US military base for interrogation and then into supervised exile, a surrender of Iraqi troops, and the admission that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "

Attempts were continued even after the war began, up to the fall of Baghdad.

Hage has since become embroiled in a situation involving an earlier incident involving airport security that many have viewed as payback similar to the case of Valerie Plame

Support and opposition

The Bush administration claimed that the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq included 49 nations, a group that was frequently referred to as the "coalition of the willing". These nations provided combat troops, support troops, and logistical support for the invasion. The nations contributing combat forces were, roughly: United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), Denmark (200), and Poland (54). Ten other countries were known to have offered small numbers of noncombat forces, mostly either medical teams and specialists in decontamination. In several of these countries a majority of the public was opposed to the war. In Spain polls reported at one time a 90% opposition to the war.

There are some that claim the US intervention took place without any international legal framework. Others would counter by pointing out that the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the 1991 invasion gave legal authority to use ". all necessary means. ", which is diplomatic code for going to war. This war ended with a cease fire instead of a permanent peace treaty. Their view was that Iraq had violated the terms of the cease-fire by breaching two key conditions and thus made the invasion of Iraq a legal continuation of the earlier war. To support this stance, one has to "reactivate" the war resolution from 1991 if a war resolution can be reactivated ten years after the fact, it would imply that almost any nation that has ever been at war that ended in a ceasefire (such as Korea) could have the war restarted if any other nation felt at any time that they were no longer meeting the conditions of the cease fire that ended that war. Since the majority of the United Nations security council members (both permanent and rotating) did not support the attack, it appears that they viewed the attack as not being valid under the 1991 resolution.

However, a resolution drafted and accepted the year before the invasion fully endorsed the use of military action to force Iraq to comply with the United Nations desires, and every country that sat upon the Security Council voted to draft that resolution.

Several nations say the attack violated international law as a war of aggression since it lacked the validity of a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize military force. The Egyptian former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called the intervention a violation of the UN charter.

The United States and United Kingdom claim it was a legal action which they were within their rights to undertake. Along with Poland and Australia, the invasion was supported by the governments of several European nations, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, and Spain.

Many people regarded the attack on Iraq to be hypocritical, when other nations such as Israel are also in breach of UN resolutions and have nuclear weapons this argument is controversial [1], as Iraq's history of actually using chemical weapons (against Iran and the Kurdish population in Iraq) suggested at the time that Iraq was a far greater threat.

Although Iraq was known to have pursued an active nuclear weapons development program previously, as well tried to procure materials and equipment for their manufacture, these weapons and material have yet to be discovered. This casts doubt on some of the accusations against Iraq, despite previous UN assertions that Iraq likely harbored such weapons, and that Iraq failed to document and give UN inspectors access to areas suspected of illegal weapons production. However, some believe that the weapons were moved into Syria and Lebanon.

Hussein Family Whereabouts

Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13th, 2003 by the U.S Army's 4th Infantry Division during Operation Red Dawn. His sons Uday and Qusay were killed earlier in 2003 during a raid by the U.S 101st Airborne Division.

Related slogans and terms

This campaign has featured a variety of new and weighted terminology, much coined by the U.S. government and then repeated by the media. The name "Operation Iraqi Freedom", for example, expresses one viewpoint of the purpose of the invasion. Also notable was the exclusive usage of "regime" to refer to the Saddam Hussein government (see also regime change), and "death squads" to refer to fedayeen paramilitary forces. Members of the Hussein government were called by disparaging nicknames - e.g., "Chemical Ali" (Ali Hassan al-Majid), "Comical Ali" (Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf), "Mrs Anthrax" (Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash) - for propaganda purposes and because Western peoples are unfamiliar with Arabic names.

    - The strategy of focusing on reducing the enemy's will to fight through a display of overwhelming force.
  • "embedding" - process of assigning reporters to particular military units
  • "coalition of the willing"
  • untidiness - Rumsfeld's term for the looting and unrest which followed the government's collapse

Media coverage

Media coverage of this war was different in certain ways from that of the Gulf War. The Pentagon established the policy of "embedding" reporters with military units. Viewers in the United States were able to watch U.S. tanks rolling into Baghdad live on television, with a split screen image of the Iraqi Minister of Information claiming that U.S. forces were not in the city. Many foreign observers of the media and especially the television coverage in the USA felt that it was excessively partisan and in some cases "gung-ho"

Another difference was the wide and independent coverage in the World Wide Web demonstrating that for web-surfers in rich countries and the elites in poorer countries, the internet has become mature as a medium, giving about half a billion people access to different versions of events.

However, the coverage itself was intrinsically biased by the fact that internet penetration in Iraq was already very weak (estimate of 12,000 users in Iraq in 2002 [1]), and the deliberate destruction of Iraqi telecommunication facilities by US forces made internet communication even more difficult. Different versions of truth by people who have equal ignorance of first-hand, raw data are by definition a very biased substitute for original, first-hand reports from people living locally.

Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network, which was formed in 1996, gained a lot of worldwide attention for its coverage of the war. Their broadcasts were popular in much of the Arab world, but also to some degree in western nations, with major American networks such as CNN and MSNBC re-broadcasting some of their coverage. Al-Jazeera was well-known for their graphic footage of civilian casualties, which American news media branded as overly sensationalistic. The English website of Al-Jazeera was brought down during the middle of the Iraq war by hackers who saw its coverage as casting a negative view on the American cause.


Blisters on the battlefield: the prevalence of and factors associated with foot friction blisters during Operation Iraqi Freedom I

Pozadina: Foot friction blisters in military personnel lessen a soldier's mobility, concentration, and critical decision-making skills.

Cilj: To determine the prevalence of and factors associated with friction blisters during deployment in all military personnel who nonurgently presented to the 28th Combat Support Hospital.

Methods: A cross-sectional survey was performed at the 28th Combat Support Hospital. Statistical tests used included descriptive statistics, chi-square tests, and logistic regression for nominal data.

Results: The response rate was 97% with 872 surveys completed. Blister prevalence was 33% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 30.0-36.4). Eleven percent of these sought treatment (p < 0.001). Factors increasing the risk of developing blisters include female sex (prevalence ratio [PR] = 1.55, 95% CI = 1.27-1.91), wearing boots not broken in (PR = 1.52, CI = 1.26-1.85), longer than 6 months in theater (PR = 1.33, CI = 1.09-1.63), and history of prior blisters (PR = 2.08, CI = 1.69-2.56).

Zaključci: The prevalence of foot friction blisters was 33% during a 12-month block of Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Of these, 11% required medical care. The group most likely to develop blisters is women, ages 26 to 34, who are unable to break in their boots and have a past history of blisters.


Gledaj video: OIF: The Drive to Baghdad