Sovjetski lider Mihail Gorbačov stiže u Washington na summit

Sovjetski lider Mihail Gorbačov stiže u Washington na summit



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Sovjetski lider Mihail Gorbačov doputovao je u Washington, DC, na trodnevne razgovore s predsjednikom Georgeom Bushom. Sastanak na vrhu posvećen je pitanju Njemačke i njenog mjesta u promjenjivoj Europi.

Kad je Gorbačov stigao na drugi sastanak na vrhu s predsjednikom Bushom, njegova situacija u Sovjetskom Savezu bila je opasna. Sovjetsko gospodarstvo, unatoč Gorbačovljevim brojnim pokušajima reformi, brzo je dostizalo kriznu točku. Ruska kontrola nad njenim satelitima u istočnoj Europi brzo je nestajala, pa su čak i sovjetske republike poput Litve išle putevima neovisnosti. Neki su američki promatrači vjerovali da bi Gorbačov, pokušavajući spasiti svoj režim koji se borio, mogao pokušati nakloniti tvrdokorne elemente u Komunističkoj partiji Rusije. Čini se da je to predviđanje potkrijepljeno ponašanjem Gorbačova na summitu u svibnju 1990. godine. Glavno pitanje na summitu bila je Njemačka.

Krajem 1989. godine Komunistička partija u Istočnoj Njemačkoj brzo je gubila kontrolu nad moći; Berlinski zid je pao, a pozivi na demokraciju i ponovno ujedinjenje sa Zapadnom Njemačkom bili su brojni. Do sastanka Gorbačova i Busha u svibnju 1990., čelnici Istočne i Zapadne Njemačke pravili su planove za ponovno ujedinjenje. To je dovelo do pitanja ujedinjene uloge Njemačke u Europi. Američki dužnosnici tvrdili su da bi Njemačka trebala postati članica Sjevernoatlantskog saveza (NATO). Sovjeti su se tome odlučno protivili, bojeći se da bi ujedinjena i prozapadna Njemačka mogla biti prijetnja ruskoj sigurnosti. Gorbačov je izrazio svoje nestrpljenje američkim argumentom kada je neposredno prije summita izjavio da "Zapad nije puno razmišljao", te se požalio da je argument u vezi s članstvom Njemačke u NATO -u "stara ploča koja stalno svira istu notu" i opet."

Summit Gorbačov-Buš završio je nakon tri dana bez jasnog dogovora o budućnosti Njemačke. Hitne gospodarske potrebe Rusije ubrzo su dovele do napretka. U srpnju 1990. Bush je Gorbačovu obećao veliki paket gospodarske pomoći i obećao da će njemačka vojska ostati relativno mala. Sovjetski vođa odustao je od protivljenja njemačkom članstvu u NATO -u. U listopadu 1990. Istočna i Zapadna Njemačka službeno su se ponovno ujedinile i nedugo zatim pristupile NATO -u.

PROČITAJTE JOŠ: Kako su prijateljstvo Gorbačova i Reagana pomogli u odmrzavanju Hladnog rata


Moskovski samit (1988.)

The Moskovski samit bio je sastanak na vrhu između američkog predsjednika Ronalda Reagana i glavnog tajnika Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza Mihaila Gorbačova. Održano je 29. svibnja 1988.-3. lipnja 1988. Reagan i Gorbačov finalizirali su Ugovor o nuklearnim snagama srednjeg dometa (INF) nakon što je američki Senat ratificirao ugovor u svibnju 1988. Reagan i Gorbačov nastavili su raspravljati o bilateralnim pitanjima poput Amerika, južna Afrika, Bliski istok i čeka se povlačenje sovjetskih trupa iz Afganistana. Reagan i Gorbačov nastavili su rasprave o ljudskim pravima. [1] Stranke su potpisale sedam sporazuma o manjim pitanjima kao što su razmjena studenata i prava na ribolov. Značajan rezultat bilo je ažuriranje sovjetskih udžbenika povijesti, zbog čega je bilo potrebno otkazati neke satove povijesti u sovjetskim srednjim školama. [2] Na kraju, Reagan je izrazio zadovoljstvo sastankom na vrhu. [3]

Pustite medije

Reagan i Gorbačov na kraju su izdali zajedničko priopćenje, čiji su odlomci prikazani ovdje:

Predsjednik i glavni tajnik smatraju da je samit u Moskvi važan korak u procesu stavljanja američko-sovjetskih odnosa na produktivnije i održivije temelje. Njihove sveobuhvatne i detaljne rasprave pokrivale su cjelokupan dnevni red pitanja o kojima su se dvojica čelnika složili na svom početnom sastanku u Ženevi u studenom 1985. -dnevni red koji uključuje kontrolu naoružanja, ljudska prava i humanitarna pitanja, rješavanje regionalnih sukoba i bilateralne odnose. Ozbiljne razlike ostaju po važnim pitanjima. Iskreni dijalog koji se razvio između dvije zemlje ostaje ključan za prevladavanje ovih razlika.

. Predsjednik i glavni tajnik naglasili su povijesnu važnost svojih sastanaka u Ženevi, Reykjaviku, Washingtonu i Moskvi u postavljanju temelja za realan pristup problemima jačanja stabilnosti i smanjenja rizika od sukoba. Ponovno su potvrdili svoje svečano uvjerenje da se nuklearni rat ne može pobijediti i da se nikada ne smije voditi, svoju odlučnost da spriječe bilo kakav rat između Sjedinjenih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza, bilo nuklearni ili konvencionalni, te njihovo odricanje od bilo kakve namjere da postignu vojnu superiornost.

Dvojica čelnika uvjereni su da prošireni politički dijalog koji su uspostavili predstavlja sve učinkovitije sredstvo za rješavanje pitanja od zajedničkog interesa i zabrinutosti. Oni ne umanjuju stvarne razlike u povijesti, tradiciji i ideologiji koje će i dalje karakterizirati američko-sovjetski odnos. No vjeruju da će dijalog potrajati jer se temelji na realizmu i usmjeren je na postizanje konkretnih rezultata. . To je proces za koji predsjednik i glavni tajnik vjeruju da je u najboljem interesu naroda Sjedinjenih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza te može pridonijeti stabilnijem, mirnijem i sigurnijem svijetu.

Kontrola naoružanja

Predsjednik i glavni tajnik, nakon što su izrazili predanost svojih dviju zemalja da nadograđuju dosadašnji napredak u kontroli naoružanja, odredili su ciljeve i sljedeće korake po širokom rasponu pitanja u ovom području. To će usmjeriti napore dviju vlada u narednim mjesecima dok međusobno i s drugim državama rade na postizanju pravičnih, provjerljivih sporazuma koji jačaju međunarodnu stabilnost i sigurnost.

Nuklearni i svemirski razgovori

Dvojica čelnika primijetili su da je izrađen zajednički nacrt teksta ugovora o smanjenju i ograničenju strateških ofenzivnih oružja. . Iako je prije nego što ovaj ugovor bude spreman za potpisivanje potreban značajan dodatni rad, mnoge ključne odredbe zabilježene su u zajedničkom tekstu nacrta i smatraju se dogovorenim, ovisno o dovršetku i ratifikaciji ugovora.

Uzimajući u obzir ugovor o strateškim ofenzivnim oružjima, strane su nastavile pregovore o postizanju zasebnog sporazuma o izgradnji Ugovora o ABM -u na jeziku zajedničke izjave na vrhu u Washingtonu od 10. prosinca 1987. Zabilježen je napredak u pripremi zajedničkog nacrta teksta pridruženog protokola.

Zajednički nacrt ugovora o smanjenju i ograničenju strateškog ofenzivnog naoružanja odražava ranije razumijevanje o uspostavljanju gornjih granica najviše 1.600 strateških ofenzivnih sustava isporuke i 6.000 bojevih glava, kao i sporazum o podzemnim stropovima od 4.900 na agregatu ICBM i SLBM bojevih glava i 1.540 bojevih glava. na 154 teške rakete.

Nacrt ugovora također bilježi sporazum strana da će se kao rezultat smanjenja ukupna težina bacanja sovjetskih ICBM i SLBM smanjiti na razinu otprilike 50 posto ispod postojeće razine i ta razina neće biti premašena.

Tijekom pregovora dvije su strane također postigle razumijevanje da će u budućem radu na sporazumu djelovati uz razumijevanje da će na raspoređenim ICBM -ima i SLBM -ima postojećih vrsta pravilo brojanja uključivati ​​broj bojevih glava na koje se poziva u zajedničkoj izjavi od prosinca. 10., 1987., a o broju bojevih glava koje će se pripisati svakoj novoj vrsti balističkih projektila bit će predmet pregovora.

Osim toga, strane su se složile oko pravila prebrojavanja teškog naoružanja bombardera prema kojemu će se teški bombarderi opremljeni samo za nuklearne gravitacijske bombe i SRAM računati kao jedno dostavno vozilo prema granici od 1.600 i jedna bojna glava prema granici od 6.000.

Izaslanstva su također pripremila zajedničke nacrte tekstova inspekcijskog protokola, protokola konverzije ili eliminacije i memoranduma o razumijevanju o podacima koji su sastavni dio ugovora. Ovi se dokumenti nadovezuju na odredbe o verifikaciji INF ugovora, proširujući ih i razrađujući ih prema potrebi kako bi ispunili zahtjevnije zahtjeve Start -a. Mjere za početak provjere uključivat će u najmanju ruku

A. Razmjena podataka, uključujući deklaracije i odgovarajuće obavijesti o broju i mjestu naoružanja ograničenih Startom, uključujući lokacije i postrojenja za proizvodnju, završnu montažu, skladištenje, testiranje, popravak, obuku, implementaciju, konverziju i uklanjanje takvih sustava. Takve deklaracije razmjenjivat će se između strana prije potpisivanja ugovora i povremeno ažurirati.

B. Polazni pregledi radi provjere točnosti ovih deklaracija.

C. Promatranje na licu mjesta uklanjanja strateških sustava potrebnih za postizanje dogovorenih granica.

D. Kontinuirano praćenje oboda i portala kritičnih proizvodnih objekata na licu mjesta radi potvrđivanja ograničene proizvodnje oružja.

E. Pregled na licu mjesta u kratkom roku:

I. Prijavljene lokacije tijekom procesa smanjenja na dogovorene granice II. Lokacije na kojima sustavi obuhvaćeni ovim ugovorom ostaju nakon postizanja dogovorenih granica i III. Lokacije na kojima su takvi sustavi bili smješteni (ranije proglašeni objekti).

F. Kratak pregled, u skladu s dogovorenim postupcima, lokacija na kojima bilo koja strana smatra da bi moglo doći do tajnog raspoređivanja, proizvodnje, skladištenja ili popravka strateškog napadačkog naoružanja.

G. Zabrana korištenja prikrivanja ili drugih aktivnosti koje ometaju provjeru nacionalnim tehničkim sredstvima. Takve bi odredbe uključivale zabranu šifriranja telemetrije i omogućile bi potpuni pristup svim telemetrijskim informacijama emitiranim tijekom leta projektilom.

H. Postupci koji omogućuju provjeru broja bojevih glava na raspoređenim balističkim projektilima svake posebne vrste, uključujući inspekciju na licu mjesta.

I. Pojačano promatranje aktivnosti povezanih sa smanjenjem i ograničenjem strateškog ofenzivnog naoružanja nacionalnim tehničkim sredstvima. To bi uključivalo otvorene izložbe predmeta ograničenih ugovorima u raketnim bazama, bazama bombardera i podmorničkim lukama na mjestima i u vrijeme koje je odabrala strana koja vrši inspekciju.

Dvije su strane također počele razmjenjivati ​​podatke o svojim strateškim snagama.

Tijekom ovog sastanka u Moskvi, razmjene na Start -u rezultirale su postizanjem značajnih dodatnih zajedničkih tačaka, posebno u područjima ALCM -a, te pokušajima da se razviju i, ako je moguće, dogovore o rješenju problema verifikacije mobilnih uređaja ICBM -ovi.

Strane su također raspravljale o pitanju ograničavanja dalekometnih SLCM-a s nuklearnim naoružanjem.

Ronald Reagan i MS Gorbačov izrazili su zajedničko uvjerenje da opsežni obavljeni posao daje osnovu za sklapanje ugovora o smanjenju i ograničenju strateških ofenzivnih oružja koji će promicati stratešku stabilnost i jačati sigurnost ne samo naroda SSSR -a i SAD -a, već cijelog čovječanstva.

Vodeći se ovim temeljnim sporazumom. izaslanstva dviju zemalja dobila su upute da se vrate u Ženevu 12. srpnja 1988. Načelno je dogovoreno da će, nakon što se riješe preostali problemi i dogovore ugovor i povezani dokumenti, potpisati Bez odgađanja.

Nuklearna ispitivanja

Čelnici su ponovno potvrdili predanost dviju strana da će na jednom forumu voditi opsežne, postupne pregovore o pitanjima vezanim uz nuklearna ispitivanja. U tim pregovorima strane će se kao prvi korak dogovoriti o učinkovitim mjerama provjere koje će omogućiti ratifikaciju Ugovora o zabrani pragova američko-SSSR-a o zabrani pragova iz 1974. i Ugovora o mirnim nuklearnim eksplozijama iz 1976., te nastaviti pregovaranje o daljim srednjim ograničenjima u nuklearnim pokusima što dovodi do krajnjeg cilja potpunog prestanka nuklearnih ispitivanja kao dijela učinkovitog procesa razoružanja. Ovaj proces, između ostalog, težio bi, kao prvom prioritetu, cilju smanjenja nuklearnog oružja i u konačnici, njegove eliminacije. U provedbi prvog cilja ovih pregovora, dogovora o učinkovitim mjerama provjere prema Ugovoru o zabrani pragova SAD-a i SSSR-a iz 1974., strane su se dogovorile da osmisle i provedu zajednički eksperiment provjere na međusobnim poligonima.

Vođe. također je primijetio značajan napredak u novom protokolu Ugovora o mirnim nuklearnim eksplozijama i pozvao na nastavak konstruktivnih pregovora o učinkovitim mjerama provjere za Ugovor o zabrani pragova.

Izražavajući uvjerenje da dosadašnji napredak čini čvrstu osnovu za nastavak napretka po pitanjima vezanim uz nuklearna ispitivanja, čelnici su uputili pregovarače da što prije završe pripremu protokola uz Ugovor o mirnim nuklearnim eksplozijama i dovrše pripremu protokola Ugovoru o zabrani testiranja praga što je prije moguće nakon što je proveden i analiziran zajednički eksperiment provjere. Potvrdili su svoje razumijevanje da će se mjere provjere TTBT -a, u mjeri u kojoj je to prikladno, koristiti u daljnjim sporazumima o ograničenju nuklearnih ispitivanja koji se kasnije mogu postići. Također su izjavili da imaju zajedničku namjeru tražiti ratifikaciju ugovora iz 1974. i 1976. godine kada se dovrše odgovarajući protokoli uz Ugovor o zabrani testiranja praga i Ugovor o mirnim nuklearnim eksplozijama, te nastaviti pregovore kako je dogovoreno u zajedničkoj izjavi na vrhu u Washingtonu. [4]

Jedan ironičan primjer summita bio je kada je Reagan poklonio Gorbačovu kopiju filma Prijateljsko uvjeravanje, čiji je scenarist Michael Wilson stavljen na crnu listu 1950 -ih zbog sumnje u komunističke simpatije. [5]


Samit u Ženevi budi sjećanja na susret Reagana i Gorbačova 1985. godine

Razgovori u srijedu između američkog predsjednika Joea Bidena i ruskog kolege Vladimira Putina izazivaju živa sjećanja na samit u Ženevi 1985. godine, kada su se prvi put sastali rivali u hladnoratovskom ratu Ronald Reagan i Mihail Gorbačov.

Unatoč prohladnom studenom u švicarskom gradu, odnosi su se počeli otopljavati između Washingtona i Moskve jer su se američki predsjednik i sovjetski čelnik suočili licem u lice na neutralnom teritoriju.

Sada, otprilike 36 godina kasnije, Biden i Putin spremni su za razgovore s manje nade o mirnim obalama Ženevskog jezera, s odjekom povijesti koji ih okružuje.

Davne 1985. "atmosfera je bila opuštena. Obojica su nešto smislili kako bi zaveli drugi kamp", rekao je bivši dopisnik AFP-a Didier Lapeyronie, koji je pratio razgovore Reagana i Gorbačova.

"U isto vrijeme, svi smo bili svjesni da je to povijesni trenutak."

Stvari su loše krenule. Neposredno prije nego što je američki predsjednik Reagan stigao na jedno od mjesta na vrhu, švicarski vojnik koji je čekao u svečanoj počasnoj straži onesvijestio se, svladao ga je velika hladnoća.

Šest godina prije konačnog raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, samit u Ženevi 1985. usredotočio se na deeskalaciju utrke u nuklearnom naoružanju između dviju velesila i došao s nadom u poticanje boljih odnosa Istok-Zapad.

Trodnevni samit pratilo je 3.500 novinara.

Summit 1985. bio je usredotočen na deeskalaciju utrke u nuklearnom naoružanju između dviju velesila i došao je s nadom u poticanje boljih odnosa Istok-Zapad / & kopiraj AFP / Datoteka

Nicolas Burgy, koji je bio na aerodromu u Ženevi za AFP kako bi izvijestio o dolasku Reagana, prisjeća se osjećaja "radosti" u zraku.

"Postojao je ležeran osjećaj", rekao je.

Jedna od najizdržljivijih slika sa summita je jedan od dva najmoćnija čovjeka na planeti koji sjede kraj kamina, smiješe se jedan drugome iz naslonjača - slika koja dočarava dojam ugodnog razgovora kraj kamina između dva stara prijatelja .

Prijatnost se proširila i na njihove supruge Raisu Gorbachevu i Nancy Reagan, koje su čavrljale uz čaj pod pogledom fotografa.

Reagan i Gorbačov upoznali su se u vili Fleur d 'Eau, vili s kraja 19. stoljeća na obali Ženevskog jezera koja je trenutno na prodaju / & copy AFP

Marie-Noelle Blessig, zadužena za praćenje suprugovog programa za AFP, sjeća se kako je vidjela Gorbačevu u posjetu sjedištu Ujedinjenih naroda u Ženevi "kako bi pozdravila osoblje u UN-u, gdje je primljena uz glasan pljesak".

Drugi znak otopljenja bio je prvi stisak ruke između Gorbačova i Reagana, koji je trajao sedam sekundi.

Povijesni trenutak zbio se ispred vile Fleur d'Eau, ljetnikovca s kraja 19. stoljeća na obali Ženevskog jezera.

Vila je trenutno na prodaju.

Rukovanje se dogodilo pred smrznutim fotografima i novinarima koji su stajali i čekali u vrtu na velikoj hladnoći.

Budući da su Amerikanci odabrali veliku vilu za prvi dan razgovora, Reagan je prvi došao tamo dočekati Gorbačova, "naizgled vrlo raspoložen", rekao je Claude Smadja, bivši zamjenik urednika švicarske televizije TSR, koji je svjedočio povijesnom trenutku.

"Odmah se našla vrlo američka, vrlo kalifornijska strana Reagana, koja se rukovala s Gorbačovom, stavljajući mu drugu ruku na rame da ga uvede unutra, i razmijenili osmijehe.

"Njih su dvoje htjeli pokazati da im je jako dobro."

Tek kad je Gorbačov stigao u vilu, Christiane Berthiaume, koja je radila za Radio Canada, shvatila je važnost trenutka.

"Nijedan novinar mu nije postavio pitanje kad je izašao iz auta. Svi smo jednostavno ostali bez riječi. To je izazivalo strahopoštovanje", rekla je Berthiaume, koja je kasnije postala glasnogovornica različitih agencija UN-a.

Prijatnost se proširila na vođe i supruge Raise Gorbacheve (lijevo) i Nancy Reagan, prikazane ovdje dvije godine kasnije na sastanku u Washingtonu DC / & copy AFP / File

Činjenica da je sovjetski vođa bio tamo na summitu s američkim predsjednikom "bio je znak da se Hladni rat, razdoblje obilježeno strahom, bliži kraju".

U znak koliko su visoki ulozi, američka i sovjetska izaslanstva odlučila su nametnuti "potpuno zamračenje" ažuriranja medija do kraja summita.

"Zapravo, unatoč osobnoj toplini, početni susret bio je vrlo oštar. Položaji dviju strana bili su jako udaljeni", rekao je Smadja, koji je postao generalni direktor Svjetskog ekonomskog foruma.

Domaćini Švicarska također su bili svjesni jaza između dviju velesila - toliko da je pomoćnik švicarskog predsjednika Kurta Furglera Walter Fust morao pripremiti za svog šefa "dva različita govora dobrodošlice, uzimajući u obzir različite kulture".

Kulturna podjela očita je i u formalnosti dviju delegacija, rekao je Fust za AFP.

"Ruski sudionici stigli su u formaciju vrlo disciplinirani. Amerikanci su bili manje strogi u pridržavanju uputa i protokolarnog naloga", rekao je.

U međuvremenu je Nancy Reagan, dodala je, htjela zamijeniti boce mineralne vode koje se isporučuju s američkim, a također je htjela i pomoćnicu koja je prije toga probala njezinu hranu.


Sovjetski vođa Mihail Gorbačov stiže u Washington na summit - POVIJEST

Dosje Reykjavik

Ranije tajni dokumenti iz američkih i sovjetskih arhiva o sastanku na vrhu Reagan-Gorbačov 1986. godine

Iz zbirki Arhiva nacionalne sigurnosti
Sveučilište George Washington, Washington DC

Arhiva nacionalne sigurnosti Elektronička kratka knjiga brojeva 203

Objavljeno - 13. listopada 2006

Uredio Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya i Thomas Blanton

Za više informacija kontaktirajte:
Svetlana Savranskaya/Thomas Blanton
202/994-7000

Dokument 2: Politbiro KZ -a SSP -a SSPS -a Rasprava o Reaganovom odgovoru na Gorbačovljevu inicijativu za sastanak u Reykjaviku i prijedlozima strateškog razoružanja, 22. rujna 1986., 2 str.

Ministar vanjskih poslova Eduard Shevardnadze izvješćuje Politbiro o svojim razgovorima u Washingtonu i obavještava sovjetsko vodstvo o Reaganovoj odluci da prihvati Gorbačovljev poziv na sastanak u Reykjaviku pod uvjetom da 25 sovjetskih disidenata, uključujući Yuryja Orlova i Nicholasa Daniloffa, optužene za špijuniranje, budu oslobođeni. Gorbačov prihvaća uvjete i iznosi svoje glavne ideje za samit. Sovjetski stav, prema njegovim riječima, trebao bi se temeljiti na prihvaćanju američkih sigurnosnih interesa, inače bi pregovori bili neproduktivni. Gorbačov teži ozbiljnom poboljšanju američko-sovjetskih odnosa.

Dokument 3: Gorbačovljeva rasprava s pomoćnicima o pripremama za Reykjavik, 29. rujna 1986., 1 str.

Na ovom sastanku Politbiroa Gorbačov još jednom naglašava važnost uzimanja u obzir američkih interesa i činjenicu da njegova nova politika stvara pozitivnu dinamiku za razoružanje u Europi. Naglašava potrebu za & quotofanzivom & quot i aktivnu prirodu novih sovjetskih inicijativa za Reykjavik.

Dokument 4: Memorandum predsjedniku, državnom tajniku Georgeu Shultzu & quotSubject: Reykjavik & quot 2. listopada 1986., 4 pp.

Ovaj kratki izvještaj od Shultza do Reagana, označen kao "Super osjetljiv", kao i formalno klasificiran kao "Tajan/osjetljiv", pokazuje da SAD nisu očekivale nikakav stvarni dogovor u Reykjaviku, već samo pripreme za budući samit u američkim razgovorima Shultza ovdje o gornjim granicama balističkih projektila, ali ne uspijeva predvidjeti dramatične dogovore Gorbačova do 50% smanjenja i proces koji vodi do ukidanja nuklearnog oružja. Ironično, Shultz kaže da je jedan od američkih ciljeva naglasiti napredak "a da se ne dopusti dojam da je sam Reykjavik bio samit", kada povijest sada vidi Reykjavik kao najdramatičniji sastanak na vrhu Hladnog rata.

Dokument 5: Gorbačovljeve upute za skupinu koja se priprema za Reykjavik, 4. listopada 1986., 5 str.

Gorbačov objašnjava svoje glavne prioritete i posebne prijedloge skupini zaduženoj za pripremu za Reykjavik. On poziva na pripremu pozicije s "potencijalom za proboj", koja bi uzela u obzir američke interese i stavila u prvi plan strateško naoružanje, a ne pitanja nuklearnih proba. Gorbačovljev krajnji cilj za Reykjavik-ponavljao je to nekoliko puta tijekom sastanka-je potpuna likvidacija nuklearnog oružja na temelju sovjetskog Programa likvidacije nuklearnog oružja od 15. siječnja 1986. do godine. postižući iskorak, kolege iz Politbiroa (uključujući Čebrikova) upozoravaju ga da ne koristi ovu riječ u pregovorima. Navečer Gorbačov daje dodatne upute Černjajevu o ljudskim pravima i po pitanju Gorbačovljeve supruge, Raise Maksimovne, koja ga prati na Island.

Dokument 6: & quotGorbačovljevi ciljevi i taktika u Reykjaviku, & quot Vijeće za nacionalnu sigurnost (Stephen Sestanovich), 4. listopada 1986., 2 str. (plus naslovna stranica od Johna M. Poindextera [savjetnika za nacionalnu sigurnost] do Shultza)

Ovaj kratki izvještaj koji je (istoga dana kad i gornja rasprava u Politbirou u Gornjoj Gorici) pripremio jedan od viših sovjetskih stručnjaka Vijeća za nacionalnu sigurnost, potpuno pogrešno predviđa ponašanje Gorbačova na summitu u Reykjaviku. Daleko od toga da je & quotcoy & quot ili & quoto neodlučan & quot o budućem samitu u SAD -u, Gorbačov je već planirao velike ustupke i iskorake. Daleko od toga da bi tijekom razgovora morao "otpuštati" Gorbačova, Reagan bi se suočio s iznimno ambicioznim nizom mogućih sporazuma.

Dokument 7: & quotPredsjednikov put u Reykjavik, Island, 9.-12. listopada 1986.-Kontrolni popis pitanja za tajnika, & quot State Department, 7. listopada 1986., 23 str. (samo prva dva odjeljka, Kontrolni popis i prolaz)

Ova detaljna brošura za tajnika Shultza pruža portret o stanju američko-sovjetskih odnosa i pregovorima uoči sastanka na vrhu u Reykjaviku. Cjeloviti sadržaj sadrži popis referentnih dokumenata i pozadine koji su također dostupni u zbirkama Arhiva nacionalne sigurnosti (od zahtjeva ZOSPI -a do State Departmenta), ali ovdje su objavljena samo prva dva odjeljka knjige sa informacijama: & quotChecklist & quot američko-sovjetskih pitanja i & quotWalk-Through & quot tema za Reykjavik agendu. Značajna je prva stavka o potonjem, koja pretpostavlja da je najbolje što će postići neki dogovor o brojnim bojevim glavama balističkih projektila između američkog prijedloga 5500 i sovjetskog prijedloga 6400, umjesto radikalnih rezova koji su završeni stolom u Reykjaviku.

Dokument 8: Sjednica Politbiroa KZ -a SSSR -a o pripremama za Reykjavik, 8. listopada 1986., 6 str.

Na posljednjoj sjednici Politbiroa prije odlaska izaslanstva u Reykjavik, Gorbačov pregledava posljednje detalje sovjetskih prijedloga. On dopušta mogućnost da bi sastanak mogao biti neuspješan i predlaže da se napravi "ustupak" za projektile srednjeg dometa, te francusko i britansko nuklearno oružje. Gorbačov vjeruje da ne bi trebalo postojati nikakvih "posredničkih" pozicija ili dogovora, koji bi se zalagali za njegov maksimalni program čak i ako bi morali biti učinjeni ustupci. Shevardnadze zvuči najoptimističnije predviđajući da bi se američka strana mogla složiti sa sovjetskim razdobljem povlačenja iz Sporazuma o protubalističkim raketama (ABM) i s 50% rezova nuklearne trijade (projektili, bombarderi, podmornice) i projektila srednjeg dometa.

Reagan i Gorbačov napuštaju Hofdi House nakon završetka summita, 12. listopada 1986. (Izvor: Predsjednička knjižnica Ronalda Reagana) [Kliknite sliku za veću verziju.]

Dokument 9: Američki memorandum o razgovoru, Reagan -Gorbačov, prvi sastanak, 11. listopada 1986., 10:40 - 12:30, 8 pp.

Dokument 10: Ruski prijepis sastanka na vrhu Reagan-Gorbačov u Reykjaviku, 11. listopada 1986. (prijepodne), objavljen u FBIS-USR-93-061, 17. svibnja 1993., 5 str.

Dokument 11: Američki memorandum o razgovoru, Reagan-Gorbačov, drugi sastanak, 11. listopada 1986., 15:30. - 17:40, 15 pp.

Dokument 12: Ruski prijepis sastanka na vrhu Reagan-Gorbačov u Reykjaviku, 11. listopada 1986. (popodne), objavljen u FBIS-USR-93-087, 12. srpnja 1993., 6 str.

Dokument 13: Memorandum o razgovoru SAD -a, Reagan -Gorbačov, Treći sastanak, 12. listopada 1986., 10:00 - 13:35, 21 pp.

Dokument 14: Ruski prijepis sastanka na vrhu Reagan-Gorbačov u Reykjaviku, 12. listopada 1986. (jutro), objavljen u FBIS-USR-93-113, 30. kolovoza 1993., 11 str.

Dokument 15: Američki memorandum o razgovoru, Reagan-Gorbačov, završni sastanak, 12. listopada 1986., 15:25 - 16:30 sati i 17:30 sati - 18:50, 16 pp.

Dokument 16: Ruski prijepis sastanka na vrhu Reagan-Gorbačov u Reykjaviku, 12. listopada 1986. (popodne), objavljen u FBIS-USR-93-121, 20. rujna 1993., 7 str.

Ova uporedna prezentacija službenih američkih transkripata sa sastanaka na vrhu u Reykjaviku i sovjetskih transkripata objavljenih u Moskvi 1993. i prevedenih od strane Strane službe za emitiranje informacija Vlade SAD-a stavlja čitatelja u neprozirno staklo na prozorima Hofdi House kao Reagan, Gorbačov, njihovi prevoditelji i njihovi ministri vanjskih poslova raspravljaju o radikalnim promjenama u razmišljanju američke i sovjetske nacionalne sigurnosti.

Dva seta transkripata iznimno su podudarni, a svaka verzija nudi nešto drugačiji tekst i pojedinosti, ali nema izravnih kontradikcija. Reagan i Gorbačov rječito izražavaju svoju zajedničku viziju ukidanja nuklearne energije i žestoko raspravljaju o svojim vrlo različitim pogledima na proturaketnu obranu. Za Reagana je SDI bila krajnja polica osiguranja od ludaka koji je ucjenjivao svijet raketama s nuklearnim vrhom u budućnosti u kojoj su uništeni svi projektili velesila i nuklearno oružje. Reagan se uvijek iznova vraća metafori držanja vaših plinskih maski čak i nakon zabrane kemijskog oružja, ali Gorbačov se osjeća kao da mu Reagan drži predavanja i kaže "Ovo je deseti put da govoriš o plinskim maskama".

Za Gorbačova, SDI je bio pokušaj SAD -a da izvede utrku u naoružanju u svemir i potencijalno izvede prvi napad na Sovjetski Savez - najveća mora za sovjetske vođe koju je Hitlerov blitzkrieg zapeo u svijesti. No, Gorbačovljevi znanstvenici već su mu rekli da se obrana od projektila može lako i jeftino suprotstaviti s više bojevih glava i varalica čak i ako je obrana ikada djelovala (što je malo vjerojatno).

Sjajno pitanje "što ako" predloženo u transkriptima iz Reykjavika je ono što bi se dogodilo da je Gorbačov jednostavno prihvatio Reaganovu očito iskrenu ponudu da podijeli SDI tehnologiju, a ne odbacio to kao smiješno kada SAD ne bi ni dijelile "strojeve za mljekodlake." Da je Gorbačov "u džep stavio" ponudu, tada bi na SAD bio izvršen pritisak da se suoče s vjerojatnom vatrom protivljenja američkog vojnog i vanjskopolitičkog establišmenta. Rad u suprotnom smjeru u korist dogovora bio bi velika podrška javnosti ovim dramatičnim promjenama, kako u SAD -u i Sovjetskom Savezu, a posebno u Europi.

Možda najviše izazivaju završne riječi ruske verzije, koje nisu uključene u prijepis SAD -a. Ova razmjena dolazi nakon što Reagan traži od Gorbačova osobnu & quotfavoru & quot; prihvaćanja ponude o SDI -u i ABM -u, a Gorbačov odgovara govoreći da to nije usluga, već pitanje principa. U američkoj verziji Reagan stoji u tom trenutku kako bi izašao iz sobe i kratku ljubaznu razmjenu u vezi s Nancy Reagan. No, u ruskoj verziji Reagan kaže: "Mislim da ionako niste htjeli postići sporazum" i "Ne znam kada ćemo imati još jednu ovakvu priliku i hoćemo li se uskoro sastati."

Dokument 17: Ruski transkript pregovora u Radnoj skupini za vojna pitanja, koju su vodili Nitze i Akhromeev, 11.-12. Listopada 1986., 52 pp.

U cjelonoćnim pregovorima sovjetskih i američkih vojnih stručnjaka usred summita u Reykjaviku, sovjetsko izaslanstvo predvođeno maršalom Sergejem Akhromeevom polazi od novog sovjetskog programa koji je upravo opisao Gorbačov na svom sastanku s Reaganom ranije tijekom dana 50% smanjenja strateškog naoružanja, nula opcija za rakete srednjeg dometa u Europi i 10-godišnje razdoblje nepovlačenja iz sporazuma o ABM-u. Istodobno, američko izaslanstvo predvođeno Paulom Nitzeom vodi raspravu praktički zanemarujući nove sovjetske prijedloge i pregovarajući na temelju američkih prijedloga od 18. siječnja 1986. koje su do sada nadmašila najnovija zbivanja u razgovorima Reagana i Gorbačova. Odgovarajući na američke prijedloge o dopuštanju razvoja SDI -a, nastavljajući s dubokim smanjenjem strateškog naoružanja, član sovjetskog izaslanstva Georgy Arbatov komentira & quot; ono što nudite zahtijeva iznimnu razinu povjerenja. Ne možemo prihvatiti vaš stav & quot, izravno implicirajući da nije postojala potrebna razina povjerenja. Ovaj dokument, pripremljen kao rezultat cjelonoćne rasprave, iznio je nesuglasice, ali nije uspio integrirati razumijevanja koja su dvojica čelnika postigla 11. listopada ili su se ponovno obratili 12. listopada.

Dokument 18: & quot Lekcije iz Reykjavika, & quot Državno ministarstvo Sjedinjenih Država, c. 12. listopada 1986., 1 str. (plus cover sheet from Shultz briefing book for media events October 17, but text seems to have been written on last day of summit, October 12)

This remarkable one-page summary of the summit's lessons seems to have been written on the last day of Reykjavik, given the mention of "today's" discussions, but leaves a dramatically positive view of the summit in contrast to the leaders' faces as they left Hofdi House, as well as to Shultz's downbeat presentation at the press briefing immediately following the summit. It is unclear who authored this document, although the text says that "I have been pointing out these advantages [of thinking big] in a theoretical sense for some time." This document plus Gorbachev's own very positive press briefing commentary immediately following the summit were included in Secretary Shultz's briefing book for his subsequent media appearances.

Document 19: Gorbachev's reflections on Reykjavik on the flight to Moscow, 12 October 1986, 2 pp.

In his remarks on the way back from Reykjavik, written down by Chernyaev, Gorbachev gives a very positive assessment of the summit. He proclaims that he is now "even more of an optimist after Reykjavik," that he understood Reagan's domestic problems and that the U.S. President was not completely free in making his decisions. He understands Reykjavik as signifying a new stage in the process of disarmament-from limitations to total abolition.

Document 20: "Iceland Chronology," U.S. Department of State, 14 October 1986, 11 pp.

This blow-by-blow, minute-by-minute chronology sums up not only the discussions given in detail in the transcripts above, but also all the preparatory meetings and discussions and logistics on the U.S. side.

Document 21: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on results of the Reykjavik Summit, 14 October 1986, 12 pp.

In the first Politburo meeting after Reykjavik, Gorbachev reports on the results, starting with a standard ideological criticism of Reagan as a class enemy who showed "extreme primitivism, a caveman outlook and intellectual impotence." He goes on, however, to describe the summit as a breakthrough, and the attainment of a new "higher level from which now we have to begin a struggle for liquidation and complete ban on nuclear armaments." The Politburo agrees with the assessment and approves the General Secretary's tough posturing.

Document 22: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session on measures in connection with the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the USA, 22 October 1986, 2 pp.

Reacting to the U.S. decision to expel Soviet diplomats, the Politburo discusses the perceived American retreat from the understandings reached at Reykjavik and decides to press Reagan to follow through with the disarmament agenda on the basis of the summit.

Document 23: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. Reykjavik assessment and instructions for Soviet delegation for negotiations in Geneva, 30 October 1986, 5 pp.

At this Politburo session Gorbachev and Shevardnadze discuss whether and when to reveal the new Soviet position on SDI testing, which would allow "testing in the air, on the test sites on the ground, but not in space." This is a significant step in the direction of the U.S. position and is seen as a serious concession on the Soviet part by Foreign Minister Gromyko. Gorbachev is very concerned that the U.S. administration is "perverting and revising Reykjavik, retreating from it." He places a great deal of hope in Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in terms of returning to and expanding the Reykjavik agenda.

Document 24: Memorandum for the President, John M. Poindexter, "Subject: Guidance for Post-Reykjavik Follow-up Activities," 1 November 1986, 1 p.

This cover memo describes the process of developing National Security Decision Directive 250 (next document) on Post-Reykjavik follow-up, led by National Security Adviser John Poindexter. The most striking aspect of this memo is Poindexter's own claim that he has incorporated as much as he can (accounting for the President's expressed bottom lines) of the Pentagon's and other objections, and that he needs to brief Reagan about remaining objections on matters that simply would not fit with the President's program.

Document 25: National Security Decision Directive Number 250, "Post-Reykjavik Follow-Up," 3 November 1986 (signed by Ronald Reagan), 14 pp.

Largely the work of NSC staffer Robert Linhard, who participated at Reykjavik, NSDD 250 attempts to keep the U.S. national security bureaucracy focused on President Reagan's goal of eliminating ballistic missiles while walking back from Reagan's expressed intent at Reykjavik to eliminate all offensive nuclear weapons. In fact, the NSDD's version of Reykjavik completely leaves out the Reagan and Shultz statements to Gorbachev about welcoming the abolition of nuclear weapons. Yet even this limited effort did not succeed in moving the U.S. bureaucracy towards realistic planning, and in fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly weighed in with National Security Adviser Poindexter to the effect that eliminating missiles would require large increases in conventional military spending.

Document 26: USSR CC CPSU Politburo session. About discussions between Shevardnadze and Shultz in Vienna, 13 November 1986, 3 pp.

Here the Politburo discusses the results of the Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in Geneva, where Shultz refused to discuss new Shevardnadze's proposals concerning what is allowed and not allowed under the ABM treaty. Shultz's position notwithstanding, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to press the U.S. to move forward on the basis of Reykjavik. Gorbachev stresses that "we have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means," referring to its significance as a new level of disarmament dialogue.

Document 27: Gorbachev Conversation with Chernyaev about Reykjavik, 17 November 1986, 1 p.

In a conversation with Chernyaev, Gorbachev talks about Soviet next steps in countering the U.S. attempts to circumvent Reykjavik. He stresses that "we cannot go below Reykjavik," and is concerned that "the Americans will not go above Reykjavik."

Document 28: Gorbachev Conference with Politburo Members and Secretaries of the Central Committee, 1 December 1986, 4 pp.

In a Politburo discussion of the Reagan decision to abandon the SALT II treaty, Gorbachev angrily states that the Americans are not doing anything in the spirit of Reykjavik and that the recent position of the Reagan administration was related to the domestic political crisis over Iran-Contra. Yegor Ligachev agrees with Gorbachev that after Reykjavik the Soviet positions only became stronger. Gorbachev speaks about his awareness of growing opposition to his disarmament proposals among the generals, who are "hissing among themselves."

Document 29: Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alton G. Keel [Executive Secretary of the National Security Council], 18 December 1986 [for meeting on 19 December to discuss NSDD 250 and other topics], 7 pp. with staff attachments and talking points


Geneva summit stirs memories of 1985 Ronald Reagan-Mikhail Gorbachev meet

Wednesday's talks between US President Joe Biden and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin evoke vivid memories of the 1985 Geneva summit, when Cold War rivals Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met for the very first time.

The November weather in the Swiss city may have been chilly, but relations began to thaw between Washington and Moscow as the US president and the Soviet leader came face to face on neutral territory.

Now some 36 years on, Biden and Putin are holding decidedly less hopeful talks on the placid shores of Lake Geneva, even as history weighs on them.

Back in 1985, "the atmosphere was relaxed. They had both lined something up to seduce the other camp," said former AFP correspondent Didier Lapeyronie, who covered the Reagan-Gorbachev talks.

"At the same time, we were all aware that it was a historic moment."

And yet the encounter was preceded with what could have been an ill omen. Just before US president Reagan arrived at one of the summit locations, a Swiss soldier waiting in the ceremonial honour guard fainted, overcome by the bitter cold.

Six years before the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1985 Geneva summit focused on de-escalating the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, and came with hopes of fostering better East-West relations.

The three-day summit was covered by 3,500 journalists.

Nicolas Burgy, who was at Geneva Airport for AFP to report on the Reagans' arrival, recalls the sense of "joy" in the air.

"There was a casual sort of feeling," he said.

One of the most enduring images from the summit is a photograph of the two most powerful men on the planet sitting beside a fireplace and smiling at each other from their armchairs in what could be a cosy fireside chat between two old friends.

The conviviality extended to their wives Raisa Gorbacheva and Nancy Reagan, who chatted over tea under the gaze of photographers.

Marie-Noelle Blessig, charged with following the wives' programme for AFP, remembers seeing Gorbacheva paying a visit to the United Nations' Geneva headquarters "to greet staff at the UN, where she was received with loud applause".

Another sign of the thaw was the first handshake between Gorbachev and Reagan, which lasted seven seconds.

The historic moment took place in front of the Villa Fleur d'Eau, a late 19th-century mansion on the shores of Lake Geneva.

The villa is currently up for sale.

The handshake took place before freezing photographers and reporters who stood waiting in the garden in the bitter cold.

As the Americans had chosen the large villa for day one of the talks, Reagan was there first to welcome Gorbachev, "seemingly in very good spirits", said Claude Smadja, a former deputy editor of Switzerland's TSR television, who witnessed the moment.

"Straight away there was the very American, very Californian side of Reagan, shaking Gorbachev's hand, putting his other hand on his shoulder to usher him inside, and the exchange of smiles.

"The two wanted to show that they were very much at ease."

It was only when Gorbachev arrived at the villa that Christiane Berthiaume, who worked for Radio Canada, realised the importance of the moment.

"Not a single journalist asked him a question when he got out of the car. We were all simply speechless. It was awe-inspiring," said Berthiaume, who later became a spokeswoman for various UN agencies.

The fact that the Soviet leader was there for a summit with the US president "was a sign that the Cold War, a period marked by fear, was coming to an end".

In a sign of how high the stakes were, the US and Soviet delegations decided to impose a "total blackout" on updating the media until the end of the summit.

"In fact, despite the personal warmth, the initial encounter was very harsh. The two sides' positions were very far apart," said Smadja, who went on to become the World Economic Forum's managing director.

Hosts Switzerland were also well aware of the gulf between the two superpowers -- so much so that the Swiss president Kurt Furgler's assistant Walter Fust had to prepare for his boss "two different welcoming speeches, taking into account the different cultures".

The cultural divide was also evident in the formality of the two delegations, Fust told AFP.

"The Russian participants arrived in formation very disciplined. The Americans were less strict on following instructions and the protocol order," he said.

Meanwhile Nancy Reagan, he added, wanted to replace the bottles of mineral water provided with US ones, and also wanted an aide to try out her food before she did.


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Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany to President George H. W. Bush

After the historic and spontaneous dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, East and West Germany were on the verge of reuniting. Helmut Kohl, the West German chancellor and later chancellor of the reunited Germany, and George H. W. Bush, president of the United States, engaged in ongoing conversations in the months leading up to reunification, which eventually took place on October 3,&hellip.

Report on the future of the Soviet Military in Eastern Europe

In May 1988, Georgi Shakhnazarov, an adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev and a champion of reform in the Soviet Union, responded to a report by Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of Warsaw Pact forces. In his comments, Shakhnazarov delineated in detail the problems with Kulikov's report, namely, his plan to continue building up the military even following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear&hellip.

State Department Views on European Security Prior to the 1990 Washington Summit

President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met for a four-day summit, their second together, in Washington and Camp David beginning on May 31, 1990. Discord had grown dramatically within the Soviet government concerning the drastic changes that had occurred in the Soviet bloc during the previous year. The following excerpt from a State Department report produced for Bush&hellip.

CIA Intelligence Assessment: Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev

As President George H. W. Bush took office in January 1989, factions within his administration disagreed concerning the approach to take with regard to US-Soviet relations. In December 1988, Gorbachev had delivered what he called a “watershed” address at the United Nations, announcing that he planned unilaterally to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000, cut conventional armaments&hellip.

Bonn Embassy cable, The German Question and Reunification

As events in Eastern Europe and especially in East Germany continued to pick up the pace, speculation began to grow, both within the two Germanies and internationally, that German reunification was once again a topic for debate. The West European had already speculated that West Germany might abandon its commitment to NATO and the European Community in favor of reunification. West German&hellip.

National Security Directive 23: United States Relations with the Soviet Union

As President George H. W. Bush took office in January 1989, factions within his administration disagreed concerning the approach to take with regard to US-Soviet relations. In December 1988, Gorbachev had delivered what he called a “watershed” address at the United Nations, announcing that he planned unilaterally to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000, cut conventional armaments&hellip.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl discuss Eastern Europe

The fall of 1989 was a turbulent one. A new reform-oriented government had been elected in Poland, new elections were scheduled in Hungary, and East Germany had a new leader, Egon Krenz, who was speaking openly about reforms in the GDR (German Democratic Republic, also known as East Germany). In this telephone conversation, U.S. President George H. W. Bush discusses the situation in Poland,&hellip.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl Make Remarks on German Unification

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and U.S. President George H. W. Bush kept in close contact throughout the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and Germany's unification on October 3, 1990. The process of German unification was complicated by the fact that there was never an official treaty ending World War II. Thus, the four victorious powers (France, the United&hellip.

Joint Press Conference of President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev at the Malta Summit

US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev held their first summit early in December 1989 onboard a Soviet cruise ship docked off the coast of Malta. Prior to arriving, Gorbachev wondered if he would be able to establish a relationship of trust with Bush as he had achieved with other Western leaders, since information coming into the Kremlin indicated that Bush’s&hellip.

Appealing to College Students in Hungary

In the summer of 1989, President George Bush made an official visit to several East European countries, each in the midst of democratic demonstrations and public pressure on their Communist regimes. These visits provided President Bush an opportunity to lend support for the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, for example, the President gave a speech at the famous Karl Marx&hellip.

NATO Statement of the Future of East-West Relations

On December 3, 1989, following the summit meeting in Malta between US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in which the leaders attested to an historic shift in US-Soviet relations, Bush traveled to Brussels to report on the meeting to a special summit of NATO leaders. The next day, Bush delivered a speech in which he discussed the issue of German reunification.&hellip.

NATO celebrates German Reunification

On 3 October 1990, the constitution of West Germany was extended to cover the five states of East Germany, reunifying Germany as a single country under one law. Congratulations were extended to the new country from around the world, including from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which could celebrate the reunification as one of its own achievements. NATO was a military alliance&hellip.


Biden-Putin Geneva Summit Stirs Memories Of 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Meet

Wednesday’s talks between US President Joe Biden and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin evoke vivid memories of the 1985 Geneva summit, when Cold War rivals Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met for the very first time.

The November weather in the Swiss city may have been chilly, but relations began to thaw between Washington and Moscow as the US president and the Soviet leader came face to face on neutral territory.

Now some 36 years on, Biden and Putin are holding decidedly less hopeful talks on the placid shores of Lake Geneva, even as history weighs on them.

Back in 1985, “the atmosphere was relaxed… They had both lined something up to seduce the other camp,” said former AFP correspondent Didier Lapeyronie, who covered the Reagan-Gorbachev talks.

“At the same time, we were all aware that it was a historic moment.”

And yet the encounter was preceded with what could have been an ill omen. Just before US president Reagan arrived at one of the summit locations, a Swiss soldier waiting in the ceremonial honour guard fainted, overcome by the bitter cold.

Six years before the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1985 Geneva summit focused on de-escalating the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, and came with hopes of fostering better East-West relations.

The three-day summit was covered by 3,500 journalists.

Nicolas Burgy, who was at Geneva Airport for AFP to report on the Reagans’ arrival, recalls the sense of “joy” in the air.

“There was a casual sort of feeling,” he said.

Fireside chat

One of the most enduring images from the summit is a photograph of the two most powerful men on the planet sitting beside a fireplace and smiling at each other from their armchairs in what could be a cosy fireside chat between two old friends.

The conviviality extended to their wives Raisa Gorbacheva and Nancy Reagan, who chatted over tea under the gaze of photographers.

Marie-Noelle Blessig, charged with following the wives’ programme for AFP, remembers seeing Gorbacheva paying a visit to the United Nations’ Geneva headquarters “to greet staff at the UN, where she was received with loud applause”.

Another sign of the thaw was the first handshake between Gorbachev and Reagan, which lasted seven seconds.

The historic moment took place in front of the Villa Fleur d’Eau, a late 19th-century mansion on the shores of Lake Geneva.

The villa is currently up for sale.

The handshake took place before freezing photographers and reporters who stood waiting in the garden in the bitter cold.

As the Americans had chosen the large villa for day one of the talks, Reagan was there first to welcome Gorbachev, “seemingly in very good spirits”, said Claude Smadja, a former deputy editor of Switzerland’s TSR television, who witnessed the moment.

“Straight away there was the very American, very Californian side of Reagan, shaking Gorbachev’s hand, putting his other hand on his shoulder to usher him inside, and the exchange of smiles.

“The two wanted to show that they were very much at ease.”

Awe-inspiring moment

It was only when Gorbachev arrived at the villa that Christiane Berthiaume, who worked for Radio Canada, realised the importance of the moment.

“Not a single journalist asked him a question when he got out of the car. We were all simply speechless. It was awe-inspiring,” said Berthiaume, who later became a spokeswoman for various UN agencies.

The fact that the Soviet leader was there for a summit with the US president “was a sign that the Cold War, a period marked by fear, was coming to an end”.

In a sign of how high the stakes were, the US and Soviet delegations decided to impose a “total blackout” on updating the media until the end of the summit.

“In fact, despite the personal warmth, the initial encounter was very harsh. The two sides’ positions were very far apart,” said Smadja, who went on to become the World Economic Forum’s managing director.

Hosts Switzerland were also well aware of the gulf between the two superpowers — so much so that the Swiss president Kurt Furgler’s assistant Walter Fust had to prepare for his boss “two different welcoming speeches, taking into account the different cultures”.

The cultural divide was also evident in the formality of the two delegations, Fust told AFP.

“The Russian participants arrived in formation very disciplined. The Americans were less strict on following instructions and the protocol order,” he said.

Meanwhile Nancy Reagan, he added, wanted to replace the bottles of mineral water provided with US ones, and also wanted an aide to try out her food before she did.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)


Soviet Union in History (Part 11)

    USSR performs nuclear test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR USSR performs nuclear test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR #3931 Batten, #4529 Webern, #4530 Smoluchowski, #4818 Elgar, #5502 Brashear & #5943 Lovi Soviet sub crashes into USS aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk off Japan USSR performs nuclear test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko named President of the Soviet Union

Događaj od Interes

    USSR performs nuclear test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR FBI arrests John A Walker Jr, convicted of spying for USSR US sailor Michael L Walker arrested for spying for USSR USSR's Vega 1 deposits lander on surface of Venus En route to Halley's Comet, USSR's Vega 2 drops lander on Venus Andrei Gromyko appointed president of USSR USSR performs nuclear test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR USSR performs underground nuclear Test USSR performs nuclear Test at Eastern Kazakh/Semipalitinsk USSR Rudolf Povarnitsin of USSR sets new high jump world record (7'10"12) Russian Igor Paklin sets new high jump world record at 2.41m in Kobe, Japan U.S. 7th Circuit Court rules Soviet defector Walter Polovchak can't be forcibly returned to parents' country if it's deemed "not in the best interests" of underage defectors President Reagan arrives in Geneva for a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev

Pripyat: Nuclear Wasteland

1986-04-26 World's worst nuclear disaster: 4th reactor at Chernobyl nuclear power station in USSR explodes, 31 die, radioactive contamination reaches much of Western Europe

'I Love You Pripyat, Forgive Me!' scrawled on the walls of a Pripyat clinic during its hasty evacuation after the Chernobyl disaster
    Soviet authorities order the evacuation of the city of Pripyat (pop. 50,000) 1 day after the Chernobyl nuclear accident Soviet TV news program Vremya announces a nuclear accident at Chernobyl nuclear power station, 2 days after the event Soviet authorities arrested Nicholas Daniloff (US News World Report) USSR charges correspondent Nicholas Daniloff with spying NYC jury indicts Soviet United Nations employee Gennadly Zakharov of spying Marina Stepanova of USSR sets 400m hurdle woman's record (52.94) USSR releases American journalist Nicholas Daniloff confined on spy charges US releases Soviet spy Gennadiy Zakharov Soviet Yankee-class sub sinks off NC, 3 die USSR expels five US diplomats

Događaj od Interes

1986-12-19 USSR frees dissident Andrei Sakharov from internal exile


BOOK REVIEW: 'Reagan at Reykjavik'

Ken Adelman, President Reagan’s arms-control director, was at the fateful October 1986 weekend summit between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Not only was he an eyewitness to and participant in what proved to be an intensely dramatic event in the Cold War, he is also a very good writer. He captures the drama and tension of those 48 hours that transports the reader to the middle of each scene of Oct. 11-12 in Reykjavik, Iceland.

The Reykjavik meeting was the unforeseen summit. There had been staff-level exchanges between the two governments to have a preliminary meeting to plan for a full-scale summit in Washington late in 1987.

Then, on Sept. 15, Mr. Gorbachev replied to a July letter from Reagan that had restated U.S. arms proposals. In his six-page reply, the Soviet leader wrote defensively about his perception that the United States was carrying out a deliberate plan to delegitimize the USSR. Then, in the final page, he switched “from nasty to nice,” proposing “a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or London, maybe just for one day” with the subject to be arms control. He added that the two could “engage in a strictly confidential, private and frank discussion (possibly with only our foreign ministers present).”

Reagan who, for a long time, had been developing a strong desire to one day eliminate all nuclear weapons, saw such a meeting as an opportunity to talk about that possibility. Therefore, rushed planning began. Both men would go with small staffs.

Hofdi House was chosen as the site for the meetings. Owned by the Icelandic government, it stood by itself, simplifying security. About the size of a suburban American home (2,300 square feet) it would be just large enough for the principals to meet and for staff meetings on the second floor.

Mr. Adelman writes that what had been expected to be an uneventful weekend turned out to be “an emotional roller coaster, full of twists and turns, ups and downs all weekend long.”

At the Saturday morning meeting, Mr. Gorbachev took the initiative by announcing his agenda items. He proposed possible reductions of strategic weapons. On the second item, intermediate weapons, he said that British and French nuclear weapons could be left as is however, American weapons should be removed from Europe. Recognizing the serious condition of the Soviet economy, he wanted strict adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and no Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by the Americans.

Reagan argued vigorously that “SDI makes the elimination of nuclear weapons possible.” His proposal was to field-test SDI with Soviet representatives observing. If the test proved practical, SDI technology would be shared with the USSR. Also, SDI would not be deployed until offensive strategic missiles were dismantled. Mr. Gorbachev was both skeptical and negative. Soviet intelligence had mistakenly concluded that SDI was much further along than it actually was. Mr. Gorbachev knew that the USSR could not bear a race over SDI, neither technologically nor economically.

He hinted that the United States could use space-based missiles to target the USSR, and he treated the shared technology offer as not serious.

The two agreed to continue their discussions in the afternoon. Along with Secretary of State George P. Shultz and USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, they left for their respective embassies.

In the afternoon, Reagan sought to overcome Mr. Gorbachev’s skepticism about SDI.

There was thrust and parry, but no agreement except to turn the agenda items over to teams of American and Russian experts. Paul Nitze, a skilled U.S. negotiator, and Sergey Akhromeyev, decorated war hero and chief of the USSR general staff, led the two teams.

After a 3 a.m. break, Akhromeyev announced a breakthrough: The Soviets would agree to a 50 percent cut in strategic weapon down to equality. Mr. Adelman concludes in his book that “Akhromeyev served nobly at Reykjavik.” The session concluded at daybreak.

The Sunday morning session devolved quickly into previous positions argued by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. Before long, however, Reagan began to speak of the benefits of the “Zero Option” — the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Mr. Gorbachev agreed in principal.

At that point, Mr. Gorbachev said he could accept Reagan’s position on intermediate-range weapons. That is, treat the respective distribution both equally and in Asia as well as Europe. Reagan then agreed to Mr. Gorbachev’s proposal to uphold the ABM Treaty for another 10 years however, when Mr. Gorbachev reiterated his proposal to restrict SDI to the laboratory, Reagan refused.

In the final session, Sunday afternoon, they argued over the wording of final statements drafted by Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze. Both agreed to stating the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons however, Mr. Gorbachev made one last argument for keeping SDI in the laboratory, and Reagan once again said he could not agree. Thus, the meeting ended with no agreement and no joint statement.

News media and many others concluded that Reykjavik had been a failure. Time and history, however, have proved that it was the climactic event of the Cold War. Mr. Gorbachev had to go home and hasten the reforms he had begun. This turned out to be an irreversible process. As it was, Reagan’s stand proved to be the last word.

Peter Hannaford is a board member of the Committee on the Present Danger. His latest book is “Presidential Retreats” (Threshold Editions, 2012).


Previously Secret U.S. and Soviet Documents on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Reveal Deal Was Closer than Believed

The documents include Gorbachev's initial letter to Reagan from 15 September 1986 asking for "a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London," newly translated Gorbachev discussions with his aides and with the Politburo preparing for the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's briefing book for the summit, the complete U.S. and Soviet transcripts of the Reykjavik summit, and the internal recriminations and reflections by both sides after the meeting failed to reach agreement.

Archive director Thomas Blanton, Archive director of Russia programs Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya, and Pulitzer-Prize-winning biographer Dr. William Taubman presented the documents to Gorbachev at a state dinner in the residence of President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson of Iceland on October 12 marking the 20th anniversary of the summit, which Grimsson commented had put Iceland on the map as a meeting place for international dialogue.

The documents show that U.S. analysis of Gorbachev's goals for the summit completely missed the Soviet leader's emphasis on "liquidation" of nuclear weapons, a dream Gorbachev shared with Reagan and which the two leaders turned to repeatedly during the intense discussions at Reykjavik in October 1986. But the epitaph for the summit came from Soviet aide Gyorgy Arbatov, who at one point during staff discussions told U.S. official Paul Nitze that the U.S. proposals (continued testing of missile defenses in the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI while proceeding over 10 years to eliminate all ballistic missiles, leading to the ultimate abolition of all offensive nuclear weapons) would require "an exceptional level of trust" and therefore "we cannot accept your position."

Politburo notes from October 30, two weeks after the summit, show that Gorbachev by then had largely accepted Reagan's formulation for further SDI research, but by that point it was too late for a deal. The Iran-Contra scandal was about to break, causing Reagan's approval ratings to plummet and removing key Reagan aides like National Security Adviser John Poindexter, whose replacement was not interested in the ambitious nuclear abolition dreams the two leaders shared at Reykjavik. The documents show that even the more limited notion of abolishing ballistic missiles foundered on opposition from the U.S. military which presented huge estimates of needed additional conventional spending to make up for not having the missiles.

The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review requests to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of Congress.

These documents are now available on the Web site of the National Security Archive: